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Train Wreck
(of the I-AA)
John R. Maney*
The curves around midnight aren't easy to see
Flashing red warnings unseen in the rain
This thing has turned into a runaway train,

ABSTRACT

In 2009, the Knight Commission, which addresses major
problems facing intercollegiate athletics, polled the presidents of the
Football Bowl Subdivision schools (I-A schools) about their views on
the state of financial affairs in college athletics. Less than 25 percent of
those polled thought intercollegiate athletics was sustainable in its
present form. As a result, the Commission recommended a series of
reforms to help maintain the health of collegiate athletics.
Unfortunately, the Commission did not poll the presidents of Football
Championship Subdivision schools (I-AA schools). They should have
polled those presidents because the I-AA schools' fiscal health is worse.
In 2010, only five I-AA schools had minimal profits in football as
compared to the large profits of sixty-nine I-A schools. Football is the
largest moneymaking sport in college athletics and, unlike basketball,
I-AA schools have unfairly been prevented from competing for, and
playing in, the Division's highest national championship and in its
elite postseason bowls. I-AA schools are also excluded from the
conferences with billion-dollar TV contracts that distribute millions to
I-A schools. To correct these inequities, this Article argues that the
National College Athletic Association (NCAA) should adhere to its
constitutional principle of competitive equity and should amend its
bylaws to eliminate the I-A/I-AA distinction. If self-reform is not
possible, this Article argues that Congress should amend the antitrust

* 2012 John R. Maney. The author is a graduate of the University of Richmond
School of Law and served as a prosecutor for the Department of Justice and an advisor for the
Department of Treasury before his retirement. The author is deeply grateful for the assistance
provided by Richard Loesing and Sophia Behnia and the rest of the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW editorial staff. This Article is much better because of it.
1.
ROSANNE CASH, RUNAWAY TRAIN (Columbia Records 1988).
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laws and scrutinize the tax law covering non-profit organizations. If
neither the NCAA nor Congress is willing to provide relief, I-AA
presidents should follow the recent lead of the National Basketball
Associationplayers and seek antitrust relief through the courts.
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The expense of a college education is astronomical, and the cost
of intercollegiate athletics is a driving factor of this expense at many
schools. Consequently, the Knight Commission, formed twenty years
ago to address major problems facing intercollegiate athletics, 2 has
turned its attention to fiscal reform. As a first step, in 2009, the
Commission polled National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

2.
Frank G. Splitt, The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics: Why it Needs
Fixing, DRAKE GRoUP, 1 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.thedrakegroup.org/SplittKnightCommission.pdf.
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Division I-A (I-A) 3 presidents to gather their views on the state of
financial affairs in college athletics.4
Less than 25 percent of university presidents polled believed
that continued operation of intercollegiate athletics in its present form
was sustainable nationally, and approximately 80 percent of
presidents who believe that sustainability is problematic at their own
institution believed that sweeping reform is necessary.5 In a follow-up
study one year later, the Commission said the "financial arms race in
[I-A schools] threatens the continued viability of athletic programs
and the integrity of our universities," 6 and concluded that "[i]t [could
not] be maintained."7
Recognizing this problem long before the survey results were
in, pundits have offered a variety of fixes. One popular solution is
changing the present postseason Bowl Championship Series (BCS) to
a playoff format. Such a move would, it is estimated, give I-A schools
an additional $600 million a year to spread among themselves. 8 But,
the Co-chairmen of the Knight Commission say, in no uncertain
terms, that I-A athletics is facing more pressing problems than the
inequity of the BCS bowl system. They suggest that the most pressing
problem facing intercollegiate athletics is the unsustainability of its
business model, which they believe "is on a path toward meltdown."'
The meltdown has begun. Between 2007 and 2009 schools
were forced to cut 227 sports from their athletic programs "mostly due
to budget shortfalls."1 0 Some entire conferences are now finding
Since 2006, the public has referred to Divisions I-A and I-AA as the Football Bowl
3.
Subdivision (FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), respectively. See NCAA,
2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 20.1.1.2 (July 2009) [hereinafter 2009-10 NCAA MANUAL],
available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/okla/genrellauto-pdfl20100302_ncaa-manual.pdf.
However, for continuity and clarity purposes, this Article will use I-A and I-AA.
See KNIGHT COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, QUANTITATIVE AND
4.
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH FOOTBALL BOWL SUBDIVISION UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON THE
COSTS AND FINANCING OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: REPORT OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

24-32 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.knightcommissionmedia.org/images/President
SurveyFINAL.pdf.
Id. at 24-25.
5.
See Letter from William E. Kirwan Co-Chairman, Knight Comm'n, et al., to Alberto
6.
Ibargiuen, President & CEO, John S. and James L. Knight Found. (June 17, 2010), in KNIGHT
COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, RESTORING THE BALANCE: DOLLARS, VALUES, AND THE
FUTURE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 1-2 (June 2010), available at http://www.knightcommission.org/

images/restoringbalance/KCIAReportF.pdf.
7.
Id.
DAN WETZEL ET AL., DEATH TO THE BCS: THE DEFINITIVE CASE AGAINST THE BOWL
8.
CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES 7 (2010).

William E. Kirwan & R. Gerald Turner, Playoffs Not the Answer to College
9.
Football's Financial Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121803510.html.
WETZEL, supra note 8, at 77-78.
10.
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themselves in the midst of financial throes. Twelve years ago, the
Western Athletic Conference (WAC) consisted of sixteen schools; by
August 2010, it was down to eight." When Boise State, the WAC's
flagship program, announced in June 2010 that it was leaving the
conference, Commissioner Karl Benson brokered a solidarity pact with
the remaining eight schools while he pursued other options.12 But
only four days later two more schools decided to leave, reducing the
Conference to just six schools.' 3
Commissioner Benson, notifying the WAC's Board of Directors
of this development in an email, said:
(We) watched the "project" disintegrate due to the unethical and selfish actions of two
college presidents. As I am sure you know by now, Fresno State and Nevada have
accepted invitations to join the Mt. West Conference. I know you all have to be
devastated by what has occurred. In a 12-hour period, the WAC went from having
14
secured a prosperous future to now not knowing what the future will be.

Since that email, the University of Hawaii also has defected.15 The
WAC has managed to attract I-AA Texas State and two schools
without football programs: the University of Texas at San Antonio
(which will form a football program) and the University of Denver
(which will be a non-football member).16 The WAC's future is bleak.
But the WAC's future is not the only one in question. In 2009,
ESPN journalist Pat Forde predicted there would be a landscape
change in college football saying the "gruesomely bloated" I-A would
soon be downsized when the forty best football teams in the country
formed four ten-team conferences.' 7 To the remaining eighty teams,
he said:
[T]ake your small stadiums and tight budgets and step-slow players to the Greyhound
buses parked outside. They're waiting to relocate you to a middle-class home of your
own. You're headed to the Tom Joad Subdivisions (motto: "They fix 'em so you can't win
nothing"), where you huddled masses can battle each other in relative obscurity while

11.
Ferd Lewis, Fleeing Members Foiled Conference's Big Plans, STAR ADVERTISER, Aug.
29, 2010, http://www.staradvertiser.com/sports/sportsnews/20100830_Fleeingmembersfoiledconferences.big-plans.html.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Andy Katz, Hawaii Joins MWC, Big West for 2012, ESPN (Dec. 10 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5907 111.
16.
WAC Expands with Three Schools, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=5792840.
17.
Pat Forde, Get Ready for a New World Order, ESPN (Aug. 3, 2009), http://sports.
espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=forde-pat&id=4369091.
18.
That is to say, welcome to the I-AA.
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9
the upper classl counts its money.... [And, he warns,] [d]on't let the marching band hit
20
you on the way out, Have-Nots.

In September 2010, the Washington Post's John Feinstein
predicted that the landscape of college football would soon change
dramatically. 21 He said:
Because the greedy presidents and commissioners don't want to share the wealth, the
power or the control of college football with their non-BCS brethren, [and because of
this] there is no playoff. Because there is no playoff, millions of corporate dollars have
been left sitting on the table. Because of that, the presidents and commissioners insist
they must expand and re-align now because (wait for it) they need more money.... Yup,
there's tradition in college football, lots of it. But the number one tradition is greed.
22
And there's never been more of it at any time in history than right now.

In September 2011, the ever-changing world of college football
saw Texas A&M jump from the Big Twelve to the Southeastern
Conference (SEC), 2 3 and the University of Pittsburgh and Syracuse
jump from the Big East to the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC). 2 4
Texas Christian University (TCU) previously of the Mountain West
Conference (Mountain West), then reneged on its commitment to join
the Big East and, in October 2011, joined the Big Twelve to fill the
hole created by Texas A&M's departure. 25 To fill the hole left by
TCU's departure, and to guard against other departures, the
Mountain West announced a football-only merger with Conference
In November 2011, the realignments
USA in October 2011.26
continued when Missouri left the Big Twelve and joined the SEC. 27 In
December 2011, Boise State and San Diego State left the Mountain
19.
In 2010, sixty-nine I-A football programs (the upper class) had a median net profit of
$9,123,000, fifty-one football programs (the lower class) had a median net loss of $2,868,000,
twenty-two athletic programs had a median net profit of $7,367,000, and ninety-eight had a
median net loss of $11,597,000. NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004-2010 NCAA DIVISION I
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 13, 28 (Aug. 2011)[hereinafter REVENUES &
EXPENSES], availableat http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/201ORevExp.pdf.
20.
Forde, supranote 17.
See John Feinstein, Greed is the Most Powerful Tradition in College Football, WASH.
21.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/02/
2010,
POST,
Sept. 3,
AR2010090205411.html.
Id.
22.
23.
Texas A&M Officially Joins SEC, ESPN (Sept. 26, 2011), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_1id/7019493.
24.
Heather Dinich, ACC Adding Big East's Syracuse, Pitt, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6988468.
25.
Angela K. Brown, TCU joins Big 12 Nearly 15 Years After Exclusion, YAHOO! (Oct.
11, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug-ap-bigl2-tcu.
26.
Steve Behr, Conference USA, Mountain West Conferences Come to Agreement,
WATAUGADEMOCRAT.COM (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www2.wataugademocrat.com/ASUSports/story/
Conference-USA-Mountain-West-Conferences-merge-id-0062 16.
Iliana Limon et al., Missouri Officially Joins SEC, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6,
27.
2
2011, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-11-06/sports/os-missouri-officially-joins-sec- 01111
06_1_mizzou-missouri-athletic-director-mike-alden.
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West and joined the Big East for football only, and the University of
Central Florida (UCF), the University of Houston, and Southern
Methodist University (SMU) left Conference USA and joined the Big
East in all sports. 28 This will go on like musical chairs and the news
will not be good for those that do not find a seat.
The US Congress, the Department of Justice, the Knight
Commission, college presidents, experts, authors, and bloggers are all
concerned about the fiscal crisis in college athletics. Their concern,
however, has been limited to the 120 I-A schools. 29 This Article
concentrates on the train wreck facing Division I-AA whose future
looks even bleaker. Only five I-AA football programs had surpluses in
2010, and they were minimal. 30 That year, the median net loss of the
remaining 115 football programs was $1.6 million. 31 No I-AA athletic
program made money in 2010,32 and the median "negative net
generated revenue"33 (loss) was approximately $9.8 million. 34 The
losses have increased steadily over the last seven years.3 5
Therefore, it was not surprising when two I-AA schools
shuttered their football programs in 2009.36 First, Northeastern
followed in the footsteps of Boston University and discontinued its
football program. 37 Explaining Northeastern's decision, the Boston
Globe reported that "the $3 million-plus annual program needed more
help-millions more each year-than Northeastern wanted to give." 38
Next, Hofstra University officials announced they were eliminating
their football program immediately because they could "use the $4.5
million spent annually on the team on scholarships and other
priorities."39
28.
Iliana Limon, Big East Officially Introduces UCF, Four Others as New Members,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2011, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/college/knights/os-ucfbig-east-1208-201.11207,0,4220643.story.
29.
The number of schools (120) in Division's I-A and I-AA is the number reported in the
NCAA's 2011 Revenue and Expense Report. REVENUES & EXPENSES, supra note 19, at 28, 54.
30.
REVENUES & EXPENSES, supra note 19, at 14, 54.
31.
Id. at 54.
32.
Id. at 14.
33.
Negative net generated revenue is the loss created when expenses exceed generated
revenue (generated revenue is that revenue generated independently by the athletic program
through ticket sales, concessions, contributions and NCAA and conference distributions). Id. at
107.
34.
Id. at 14.
35.
Id. at 53 (noting the loss increased from $5,907,000 in 2004 to $9,789,000 in 2010).
36.
Infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
37.
Andrew Ryan, Northeastern Calls an End to Football,Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2009, at
B9. Boston University eliminated its program in 1997. Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Frank Eltman, Ho/stra Drops Football Program, LONG ISLAND PRESS, Dec. 3, 2009,
http://www.longislandpress.com/2009/12/03/hofstra-drops-football-program.
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Jim O'Day, athletic director of the University of Montana, has
considered how the turmoil in Division I-A could affect I-AA
Montana. 40 In a recent email he declared it was possible this turmoil
could cause Division I-AA to fail, and as a result, he wondered
whether the NCAA could force Montana into Division II*41 Mr. O'Day,
at least, sees the flashing red warnings.
This Article will look at the creation of the NCAA, the
development of Divisions I, II, and III within the NCAA, and how
large football schools created two football subdivisions (Divisions I-A
and I-AA) within Division I. It will also demonstrate how the I-A
schools created a lucrative postseason arrangement, the BCS, which
determines the I-A national championship, and how this is financially
detrimental to I-AA schools. This Article contends that the creation of
special subdivisions I-A and I-AA within Division I, for football only,
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. However,
instead of filing an antitrust lawsuit, this Article recommends that
Division I-AA presidents work within the NCAA to eliminate the
bylaw that divides Division I into two football subdivisions. An
antitrust lawsuit, however, should remain an option. 42
I. THE NCAA
A. Origins
The NCAA owes its existence to college football. When Rutgers
and Princeton met on November 6, 1869, to "kick-off' the first
intercollegiate game, football was essentially a lawless event loosely
governed by a combination of rugby and soccer rules. 43 In 1876, a
meeting was convened to hammer out a precise set of rules that would
bring some semblance of order to this fledgling sport.44 At this
meeting, representatives from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and
Columbia formed the Intercollegiate Football Association and adopted

40.
See Text of Jim O'Day's E-mail, MISSOULIAN, Oct.1, 2010, http://missoulian.com/
article 44bbeda2-cdde-1ldf-9730-001cc4cOO2e0.html.
41.
See id.
42.
In 2011, after over 100 days of labor negotiations between the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and its players' union, the union was given a take it or leave it ultimatum.
Gabe Feldman, The Nuclear Winter is Over: The New CBA, and How the Lawyers Saved the Day
(Sort of), GRANTLAND THE TRIANGLE BLOG (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.grantland.com/blog/thetriangle/post/_/id/11258. In response, the players dissolved their union and filed an antitrust
lawsuit; shortly thereafter, with the NBA backing off of its ultimatum, a deal was reached. Id.
43.
RANDY R. GRANT ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 8 (2008);
Gridiron Football, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/212839/gridiron-football (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
44.
GRANT ET AL., supra note 43.
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the more violent rugby-type rules. 4 5 This turned out to be a bad
decision.
As a result of these violent rules, over three hundred players
died from football injuries between 1890 and 1904 and many more
were seriously injured. 46 By October 1905, the problem was so acute
that President Roosevelt convened a meeting with the Intercollegiate
Rules Committee (Harvard, Yale, and Princeton). 47 As the meeting
began, the President made it clear the future of the sport was in
jeopardy unless something was immediately done about the violence. 48
The participants said that the football season was just beginning, but
agreed to address the problem at the end of the year. 49 The violence
continued. During the 1905 season, eighteen more college players, as
well as forty-six high-school students, died as a result of football
But at least, as promised, the Intercollegiate Rules
injuries. 5 0
Committee met in December 1905 and formed the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) to address the
violence.5 1
This new association immediately began changing the rules.
However, these changes proved to be ineffective, as 1909 saw
In 1910, the IAAUS
thirty-two more football-related deaths. 52
changed its name to the NCAA and by 1911 the organization had
grown from its original thirty-nine members to ninety-five members. 53
After surviving its early years, football became a very popular
sport. The 1920s saw more than 10 million fans trip the turnstiles
(double that of the prior decade) and by the time the 1930s began,
college football was known as "America's greatest sporting spectacle
(as opposed to baseball, which was the national pastime)." 54
While the NCAA helped bring football back from the brink of
extinction in 1910, it did not finally gain regulatory authority until
1953.55 This authority, however, was almost lost when the members
called upon it to control the revenue flow from TV and postseason
bowls. Small schools wanted some of this money and large schools did

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 15.
GridironFootball, supra note 43.
Id.
GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 16.
Id.
Id. at 16, 19.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 23.
GridironFootball, supra note 43.
GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 33.
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not want to share it.56 As it turned out, "[d]ivvying up these huge
revenues nearly tore the NCAA apart."57
An equally contentious issue was the makeup of the NCAA
divisions. In 1910, the NCAA had an executive committee of national
officers and one representative from each of the seven regional
districts.5 8 By 1916, there were nine districts and each school had a
In 1956, the NCAA created the Collegiate and
single vote. 59
University Divisions for championship tournaments, and schools could
participate where they felt they would be most competitive.60 The
University Division retained the existing tournaments, and the
Collegiate (College) Division gradually added tournaments to its
division. 6 1 In 1968, after championship tournaments were in place for
most sports in the College Division, schools were required to select a
division; 223 selected the University Division (those emphasizing
football) while 386 selected the College Division. 62
But problems remained. The University Division continued to
have a "one member-one vote" policy 6 3 and larger schools were not
happy about it; in addition, schools in the College Division had their
own differences. 64 Accordingly, the NCAA called a special convention
in 1973 and created three separate divisions for voting and
competing.6 5 The University Division became Division I and the
College Division became Divisions II and 111.66 Instead of letting an
institution pick where it wanted to go, the NCAA assigned institutions
to a division "based essentially on the size and ambitions of the
football program."6 7 Problems still remained, and these problems
spawned Division I-AA.
B. Birth of Division I-AA
One major problem the larger Division I football programs had
was that they still thought they were sharing too much television
revenue with the smaller schools. 68 In an effort to solve this problem
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

GridironFootball, supranote 43.
Id.
GRANT ET AL., supranote 43, at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id.
See Gridiron Football,supra note 43.
See id.
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in 1976, more than sixty-one of the largest college football programs
formed a cartel 69 known as the College Football Association (CFA). 70
The CFA's purpose was to reduce the number of football teams in
Division I and lobby the NCAA for voting reform.7 ' If the CFA schools
could not get the changes they wanted within the NCAA, they planned
to negotiate their own television contract. 72
Faced with the prospect of the premier football schools entering
into their own TV contract, "the NCAA at its 1978 convention split
Division I into I-A (the big-time football schools) and I-AA."7 3 This
split, which is developed below, applies only to football;7 4 all other
Division I sports have the same number of scholarships. 7 5
1. Infancy
Why is football treated differently than all other sports in
Division I? The answer, in a word, is money. When the NCAA created
Division I-A to satisfy the CFA schools, another football cartel was
born. However, the expulsion of thirty-eight schools from I-A in 1978
did not satisfy the big-time CFA schools.7 6 They wanted a larger
purge.7 7 In June 1981, the CFA received the more lucrative NBC-TV

69.
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 97-98. A cartel is a group of independent
businesses with formal agreements on how each firm will produce and sell and with other limits
on competition such as advertising. Id. at 71.
70.
Id. at 53-54. The CFA consisted of the SEC, the ACC, the WAC, the Big Eight, the
Southwest Conference and many major independents such as Notre Dame, Penn State,
Oklahoma and Syracuse. GridironFootball, supra note 43.
71.
See GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 97-98; see Jonathan Feigen, College Football
Association Cites Lack of Authority, Votes to Disband, HOUS. CHRON., June 1, 1996, at 4 ('The
CFA was formed to negotiate television contracts for its members, provide football with a greater
voice in the NCAA legislative process and lead to restructuring of the NCAA."); I-AA Playoffs in
Trouble Without Money from TV, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1985, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1985-09-22/sports/8503040698 1_ncaa-division-i-aa-television-networks-black-entertainmenttelevision ("The big football schools wanted a forum within the NCAA because they constantly
were outvoted on key issues by the smaller schools.").
72.
GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 97-98.
73.
See Gridiron Football,supra note 43.
74.
GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 40.
75.
NCAA, 2010-11 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.5 (Maximum Institutional Grant-In
Aid Limitations by Sport) (2010), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1ll.pdf
[hereinafter 2010-11 NCAA MANUAL].
76.
John O'Connor, Division I Castoffs in Fight For Poll Position, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1985, at C1.
77.
Cf. NCAA Slices 39 Schools From I-A; CFA Approves, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 3,
1982 [hereinafter NCAA Slices]. The larger purge had not taken place in 1978 because of a last
minute amendment that allowed any school sponsoring twelve varsity sports to remain in I-A.
Id. While the smaller schools were initially victorious, this last minute amendment further
unified the big-time CFA schools in their effort to obtain a TV football contract. See id.
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offer it had been seeking,7 8 but the offer was contingent upon the Big
Eight and SEC becoming part of the package.7 9
The threatened breakaway tactics proved successful. With the
Big Eight and SEC pondering their future, the NCAA immediately
sprang into action and called a special convention in December 1981
for all 907 Association members.8 0 It also, however, threatened to
sanction any school that accepted NBC's offer.81 In response, two CFA
schools (Georgia and Oklahoma) filed an antitrust suit in September
1981 seeking relief from the threatened sanctions and alleging that
the NCAA's 1982-85 contracts with ABC, CBS, and Turner were in
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 8 2
In spite of this lawsuit, the NCAA held the previously called
convention in December 1981, at which time they moved more schools
into I-AA because they did not meet new, specially crafted, standards
Included in this mass purge were
for membership in I-A.8 3
independents and schools from the Southern Conference, the
Mid-American Conference (MAC), the Ivy League, the Missouri
Valley, and the Southland Conference.84 In total, forty-three schools
were purged after the last three lost their appeal at an August 1982
meeting.85
What was the "reason for the splitting of Division I?," asked the
The answer, it said, was because
Richmond Times Dispatch.8 6
"[big-time football schools were not satisfied with their share of
television time and remuneration."87 Therefore, the NCAA "somewhat
78.

Id.

Id. While these conferences indicated they were inclined to join, they said their final
79.
decision would not be made before the NCAA announced whether it would call a special
restructuring convention. Id.
John Underwood, To-Do Over What to Do, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 21, 1981, at
80.
34.
Id.
81.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-82 (W.D.
82.
Okla. 1982) (citing Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006)).
See NCAA Slices, supra note 77. To remain in Division I-A a school had to: (1) have
83.
averaged at least 17,000 paid home attendance during the four prior years, or (2) play in a
30,000 seat stadium and averaged 17,000 paid home attendance in at least one of the last four
years, (3) play at least eight varsity sports including football, (4) play at least sixty percent of
their games against I-A members. Id. However, even if a school did not meet these and other new
criteria the NCAA would not expel it if there were at least six football teams in its conference
and more than half met Division I-A criteria. Id.
84.
Division I-AA Features New Teams, NCAA NEWS, Aug. 25, 1982, at 3, available at
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/1982/19820825.pdf. A few schools in the Missouri
Valley Conference and the MAC did retain I-A classification. Id.
See id. (the University of Cincinnati, Miami University (Ohio) and Western
85.
Michigan).
86.
See O'Connor, supra note 76.

87.

Id.
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reluctantly" moved these schools from Division I to the new Division
I-AA. 88 According to the New York Times, the NCAA expelled the Ivy
League "from big-time college football" and "demoted [it] to the
[NCAA's] Division I-AA" because of "a squabble over television
revenue."8 9 During the twenty-five years leading up to its expulsion,
Ivy League schools won more than half of their out-of-conference
games, often against prominently known opponents.9 0 In 1981, for
example, Yale was one of the most powerful teams in the east with a
9-1 record and three future NFL draft picks. 91
In 2006, John Rogan, who quarterbacked Yale's 1981 team,
said it had been "painful to watch the unnecessary atrophy of the
league." 92 In a similar vein, Yale's athletic director, Thomas Beckett
said, "[t]he Ivy League should have remained in the top division of
college football. We still play quality football with gifted students,...
it would have been a wonderful way to continue a worthy tradition."93
Joe Restic, who coached Harvard's football team from 1971 to 1994,
echoed this sentiment. 94 He said:
It's depressing when you can walk up to one of those great old Ivy League places 15
minutes before game time and buy a ticket without even waiting in line. ... It all
started with the I-AA classification. Right away the recruits said to us, "I don't want to
95
play with the second-class citizens."

Furman, too, became "a second-class citizen" when the NCAA
moved it, along with the rest of the Southern Conference, into I-AA.96
In 1980, Furman had a 9-1 record and a Power Rating of 28 out of 139
Division I-A schools, which placed it ahead of schools such as, Arizona
State, Louisiana State University, Texas, Virginia Tech, Clemson,
Arkansas, Tennessee, Iowa State, North Carolina State, West
Virginia, Auburn, Kansas, Syracuse, Indiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma
State, Michigan State, Illinois, Wisconsin, Georgia Tech, and TCU. 9 7
In 1981, Furman's record slipped to 8-3 and its Power Rating
fell to 45 out of 138, but it was still ahead of Virginia Tech, Tennessee,
Maryland, Syracuse, Iowa State, Auburn, Boston College, Minnesota,
88.
Id.
89.
Bill Pennington, Ivy Football and Academics Strike an Uneasy Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/17/sports/ncaafootball/17ivy.html.
90.
Id.
91.
See generally id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
See Southern Conference, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/clcweb/
publishing.nsf/Content/institutionprofile-NBP.html?open&ucode=SC (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
97.
James Howell, 1980 NCAA Division IA Football Power Ratings, JHOWELL.NET,
http://www.jhowell.net/cflcfl980.htm (last updated Dec. 15, 2006).
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Arizona, North Carolina State, Purdue, Michigan State, Mississippi,
Kansas State, Texas Tech, Georgia Tech, and Indiana to name a few.98
At the same time, the Southern Conference had, a higher Power
Rating than the MAC in both 1980 and 1981.99 Yet the NCAA
shuffled the MAC back into the first tier a year after it had shuffled
them out,10 0 while the Southern Conference remained, and still
remains, among the "second-class citizens."10 1 It is easy to see why the
Daily Oklahoman reported that this purge was "one of the most
divisive issues in the association's history."102
In addition to reducing the number of universities in what was
to become Division I-A, the CFA also obtained the political reform it
wanted, which went "a long way toward providing [them with] the
proper legislative forum to vote on rules and regulations that have a
major impact on the quality of football sponsored by Division I-A
members." 103
Today, I-A membership requires actual or paid attendance of at
least 15,000 at each home football game once in a two-year period and
at least sixteen varsity sports.10 4 It also entitles a school to eighty-five
football scholarships, 0 5 90 percent of which the school must fill on a
rolling two-year period.10 6 In addition, each I-A school must offer a
minimum of two-hundred scholarships or spend at least $4 million on
athletic scholarships annually. 107 In contrast, I-AA schools only have
to sponsor fourteen varsity sports 08 and do not have a football
attendance requirement. Moreover, they are limited to sixty-three
football scholarships 09 and only need to spend $1.2 million on
scholarships annually." 0 One advantage of being in I-A is having the
opportunity to compete for the BCS National Championship and share
the loot generated by the BCS bowls.

98.
James Howell, 1981 NCAA Division IA Football Power Ratings, JHOWELL.NET
http://www.jhowell.net/cf/cfl981.htm (last updated Dec. 15, 2006).
99.
See sources cited supranotes 97-98.
See O'Connor, supra note 76.
100.
101.
Pennington, supra note 89.
102.
See NCAA Slices, supra note 77.
103.
Id. (quoting Charles M. Neinas, executive director of the CFA).
104.
2010-11 NCAA MANUAL §§ 20.9.7.1 and 20.9.7.3.
105.
Id. § 15.5.6.1.
106.
Id. § 20.9.7.4(a).
107.
Id. § 20.9.7.4(b).
108.
Id. § 20.9.8.1.
109.
Id. § 15.5.6.2.
110.
Id. § 20.9.1.2(b).
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II. THE BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES
The BCS, a CFA progeny, is a football arrangement consisting
of five postseason bowl games, the last of which is the BCS National
Championship Game.1 11 To compete in this arrangement, a school
must be in Division I-A. 1 12
The BCS traces its direct lineage to the Bowl Coalition
arrangement, which was formed in 1992; however, due to its
limitations the Coalition changed its format and became known as the
Bowl Alliance in 1996.113 The Bowl Alliance had its own limitations
and its format was changed in 1998 when the Bowl Alliance became
the BCS. 114 The BCS is not an entity; rather, it is a five-game
arrangement "designed to match the two top-rated teams in a national
championship game and to create exciting and competitive match-ups
among eight other highly regarded teams in four other bowl games."11 5
This arrangement is made up of the Rose Bowl, Fiesta Bowl, Orange
Bowl, and Sugar Bowl (BCS bowls), as well as a national
championship game.1 16 The event, in its present form, is scheduled
through the 2013 season.11 7
The BCS has problems however, because some of its
participants do not believe it treats them fairly. For example, it
automatically extends invitations to play in games to the champions of
the ACC, Big East, Big Ten, Big Twelve, Pac-Twelve, and the SEC,
and to Notre Dame if it ranks eight or higher in the BCS standings
(the automatic qualifiers).1 1 8 Senator Orrin G. Hatch calls these
conferences "the privileged conferences."' 1 9 Sports fans often refer to
them as "BCS Conferences." The BCS maintains, however, all eleven
conferences are BCS Conferences because they all manage the BCS. 120
In fact, the BCS says "the term 'BCS Conference' is one of the most
111.
BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2010-2011 MEDIA GUIDE 5 (2010) [hereinafter BCS
MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11], available at http://a.espncdn.com/i/ncflbcs/bcsguide201Ob.pdf. Until 2006,
there were only four bowl games, including the national championship game, which was played
at one of the bowl sites on a rotating basis. See id. at 49. Beginning in January 2007, a fifth game
was created, and now there are four bowl games plus the national championship game, which
teams play at one of the four bowl sites on a rotating basis. Id. at 47.
112.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 46-47.
113.
114.
Id. at 47.
115.
Id. at 5.
116.
Id.
117.
See id. at 8.
118.
Id.
Press Release, Orrin Hatch, Senator, U.S. Senate, Hatch Requests DOJ
119.
Investigation into BCS (Oct. 21, 2009), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2009/10/hatchrequests-doj-investigation-into-bcs [hereinafter Hatch Press Release].
120.
BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11, supra note 111, at 5.
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misused [terms] in sports." 12 1 In spite of what the BCS maintains,
most believe there are two classes of conferences within this
This Article refers to the so-called privileged
"arrangement."
Conferences, as "first-class conferences."
or
BCS
conferences,
The five remaining or second-class I-A conferences (the
Mountain West, Western Athletic, Sun Belt, Mid-America conferences,
and Conference USA)122 must earn an invitation to a BCS bowl. 1 2 3
Their major complaint is that it is difficult for their teams to
automatically qualify.124 In order to automatically qualify, a team in a
second-class conference must finish twelfth or higher in the BCS
standings (or sixteenth or higher and be ranked above a champion of a
conference that automatically qualifies). 125 Should more than one
team qualify, only the highest ranked team in the final BCS standings
will be given the automatic bid. 126 If there are fewer than ten
automatic qualifiers, then the bowls will select "at-large" participants
to fill the remaining berths. 127 These rules work to exclude the
second-class conferences from the major bowls. During the four years
from 2006-09, the first-class conferences and Notre Dame took home
more than $492 million or 87.4 percent of the BCS receipts, while the
second-class conferences received less than $62 million or 12.6 percent
of the take. 128
The exclusion of teams in second-class conferences is not only
financially unfair to these conferences, but it is also unfair to the fans.
For example, "[t]he [2010] regular season game between Boise State
[from a second-class conference] and Virginia Tech had the
second-highest [TV] ratings of any game th[at] year, including
conference championships." 129 Yet Boise State, while winning that
game and only losing once the rest of the year (by a last minute field
goal to a ranked team), did not get invited to a BCS bowl.130 Virginia
Tech, on the other hand, lost to I-AA James Madison the following
week, but under the BCS qualification system, was eventually invited
BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 2009-2010 MEDIA GUIDE 6 (2009) [hereinafter BCS
121.
MEDIA GUIDE 2009-10], available at http://collegefootball.procon.org/sourcefiles/mediaguide.pdf.
The Mountain West and Conference USA merged for football purposes in 2011,
122.
supra note 25.
123.
Id. at 6.
124.
See Hatch Press Release, supranote 119.
125.
See BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11, supra note 111, at 8.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 9.
128.
See Hatch Press Release, supra note 119.
Sally Jenkins, BCS Title Game Crowns a Champion of a FraudulentSystem, WASH.
129.
POST, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/ AR2011
011006115.htmL.
Id.
130.
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to the Orange Bowl as the automatic qualifier from the ACC.131 These
examples highlight why the BCS system is flawed and show that it
needs change.
Eighty-five percent of the people in a 2007 Gallup poll said that
they preferred to see the I-A national champion crowned through a
playoff, 13 2 but in spite of fan preference, the bowl system goes on.
Beginning in 2011, and for the next four years, ABC and ESPN will
pay approximately half a billion dollars for BCS television rights.13 3
As a result of this disparity, in 2009 the second-class I-A conferences
proposed an eight-team playoff system to get a fair shot at the
national championship trophy and a larger share of the pot. 1 34 The
BCS Presidential Oversight Committee (controlled by Notre Dame
and the six first-class conferences), however, rejected this proposal. 135
They did so even though all other college varsity sports (including
I-AA football) determine their champion through a playoff system. 136
Why the NCAA treats football differently is under scrutiny by
Congress. 137 The House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection
investigated the BCS from 2005 to 2009.138 The Senate Judiciary
Committee conducted inquiries regarding potential antitrust
violations in 1997, October 2003, and July 2009.139
At the conclusion of the 2009 Senate Hearings, Senator Orrin
G. Hatch summoned the Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate
the BCS and then sent a formal letter to President Obama advising
him that "[a]t its most basic level, the BCS is 'an agreement among
competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another'
and how they will compete with schools outside their elite circle." 140
In January 2010, the DOJ advised Senator Hatch that the
Antitrust Division was considering whether to launch an inquiry into

131.
James Howell, Virginia Tech Historical Scores, Jhowell.net (last updated Jan. 15,
2011), http://www.jhowell.net/cf/scores/VirginiaTech.htm.
132.
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, CIRCLING THE BASES:
PROSPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 181 n.3 (2011).

ESSAYS ON THE

CHALLENGES AND

133.
Rich Thomaselli, As College Football's TV Landscape Changes, Brands Still Find
Marketing Opportunities, ADVERTISINGAGE (July 26, 2010), http://adage.com/article/specialreport-sports-marketing-2010/espn-locks-bes-500m-advertiser-holes-fill/145068.
134.
Ryan Christopher DeVault, BCS Rejects Playoff Plan for College Football,
ASSOCIATED CONTENT (June 25, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1877853/bcs
rejects-playoff plan for college.html.
135.
Id.
ZIMBALIST, supra note 132, at 59.
136.
137.
Id. at 48.
138.

Id.

Id.
139.
140.
See Hatch Press Release, supra note 119 (quoting Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, U.S.
Sen., to Barack H. Obama, U.S. President (Oct. 21, 2009)).
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his antitrust allegations. 141 In May 2011, Assistant Attorney General
Christine Varney sent a letter to NCAA President Mark A. Emmert
asking for his views on the "best course of action with regard to the
BCS" because "[s]erious questions continue[d] to arise suggesting the
current Bowl Championship Series system may not be conducted
consistent with the competition principles expressed in the federal

antitrust laws." 1 42
In response, the NCAA diplomatically informed the DOJ that
its "questions [could] best be answered by the BCS and the group of
institutions that operate the BCS system." 143 This is so, the NCAA
explained, because the BCS does not fall under its purview. 144 This
explanation is not exactly accurate since licensing bowls to participate
in the postseason bowl system does fall within its purview. 145 In any
event, the NCAA strangely punted when asked for its views on the
BCS system; 146 therefore, the DOJ will have to look elsewhere for its
answers. If the DOJ launches an antitrust investigation, those
involved should bear in mind that both Section 1 and section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act provide for criminal remedies as well as civil
sanctions.147
Indeed, when speaking about antitrust violations, the United
States Attorneys' Manual states: "While every violation of this Act is
technically a felony, the Department reserves criminal prosecution for
so called 'naked' or 'per se' unlawful restraints of trade among
competitors, e.g., price fixing, bid rigging, and customer and territorial

DOJ Mulls Antitrust Probe of College Football Championships, CNN POL. TICKER
141.
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/30/doj-mullsantitrust-probe-of-college-football-championships. The DOJ further said that the Obama
Administration was looking at various other options such as: (1) encouraging the NCAA to take
control of postseason football as it does with other sports, (2) requesting an examination by the
Federal Trade Commission under consumer protection laws, (3) looking into possible legislative
initiatives, and (4) looking into roles other agencies could play. Id.
Feds to NCAA: Why No Playoffs?, ESPN (May 5, 2011, 5:09 PM), http://sports.
142.
espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6479279.
Frederic J. Frommer, NCAA Tells DOJ Football Playoff Out of its Hands, WASH.
143.
TIMES, May 18, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/may/18/ncaa-tells-doj-football
-playoff-out-of-its-hands.
144.
Id.
Jon Solomon, Fiesta and Insight Bowls Keep Licenses, Land on NCAA Probation,
145.
AL.COM (May 17, 2011), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2011/05/fiestaand insight owls
keep.html. Two days after BCS sanctions were announced, the NCAA re-licensed the Fiesta
bowl. Id.
Could it be that the NCAA does not want the DOJ to stick its nose under the March
146.
Madness tent?
See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
147.
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allocation agreements." 1 48 In 2009, attorney Barry J. Brett, testifying
before Senator Hatch's subcommittee on behalf of a second-class
conference, described the BCS as "a naked restraint imposed by a
self-appointed cartel." 149 Perhaps Mr. Brett has been reading the
United States Attorneys' Manual.
William Monts, who represented the BCS before the same
Senate Subcommittee, argued that the BCS did not violate the
Antitrust Act because it was procompetitive in that it created a
national championship game that did not previously exist.150 He
further argued that non-championship BCS bowls are more
competitive because they are able to select their teams after the
regular season ends; that the BCS strengthens the broad-based bowl
system, thus maximizing the number of postseason playing
opportunities for the students; and that it preserves and enhances the
regular season.15 1
Aware of the mounting criticism against it, the BCS, in its 2010
Media Guide, adds that the "Championship Game usually trails only
the Super Bowl in terms of television ratings for sporting events," and
that, when compared to a playoff, it enjoys the support of 93 percent of
I-A coaches. 152 When it comes to money, Bill Hancock, its executive
director, notes that the five I-A conferences that do not automatically
qualify for BCS bowls do much better under the BCS system than they
did without it, pointing out they received a record $24 million from
BCS games in 2010.153
In rebuttal, the University of Utah's President Michael Young
argues:
If someone suggested that college baseball and college basketball change their
operations to effectively eliminate nearly half of their participating teams from the
national championship even before their seasons begin, that person would be soundly
criticized and subject to tremendous ridicule. Similarly, if someone proposed a system
for a new college sport in which 120 universities were to participate, and suggested that
nearly half of those institutions would be, for all practical purposes, eliminated from the

148.

U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

§

7-4.100 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usaoleousalfoia-reading-room/usam/title7/
4mant.htm.
149.
The Bowl Championship Series: Is it Fair and In Compliance with Antitrust Law?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol'y and Consumer Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 40 (2009) [hereinafter BCS Hearing] (statement of Barry J.
Brett, Esq., Partner, Troutman Sanders).
150.
Id. at 178 (statement of William Monts III, Partner, Hogan & Hartson).
151.
Id.
152.
See BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11, supra note 111, at 5, 7.
153.
Bill Hancock, BCS Responds to Sens. Hatch and Baucus, Telling Them to Mind
Their Own Business, ORLANDO SENTINEL C. GRIDIRON BLOG (May 20, 2010), http://blogs.
rlandosentinel.com/sports-college/2010/05fbcs-responds-to-sens-hatch-and-baucus-telling-themto-mind-their-own-business.html.
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national championship even before their seasons begin, that person's idea would be met
15 4
with tremendous derision.

He summed up, adding, "the George Mason story in basketball
showed that everybody loves the underdog."1 66 The story is about
George Mason's showing in the 2006 NCAA basketball tournament.156
It was quite a Cinderella story about a commuter school from the I-AA
Colonial Athletic Association that knocked off North Carolina,
Michigan State, and Connecticut on its way to the Final Four.15 7
Unsurprisingly George Mason's applications were up 25 percent in
2007 as compared to the 10 percent increase in prior years.15 8 More
importantly, the growth was "especially noticeable in high-achieving
applicants."1 5 9
The George Mason name is now synonymous with sports
upsets. USA Today has referred to Boise State as "the George Mason
of college football" and called giant-killer Trinidad and Tobago "the
George Mason of the World Cup."160 As the school's president, Alan
Merten, quipped, "We've become a noun."161 The next "George Mason"
appeared on the scene in 2010 when the I-AA Butler Bulldogs lost a
thrilling 61-59 game to the storied Duke Blue Devils in the national
championship.16 2 The Butler-Duke game demonstrated that I-AA
conference teams could achieve wide fan appeal. The ratings for this
game were 31 percent higher than the North Carolina-Michigan State
championship game the previous year, and it had the highest number
of viewers since the Arizona-Kentucky final in 1997.163

The Virginia Commonwealth Rams, also from the Colonial
Athletic Association, became the next basketball Cinderella. After
defeating Southern California, Georgetown, Purdue, and Kansas in
the 2011 NCAA tournament, headlines in the Washington Post

154.
BCS Hearing, supra note 149, at 232 (testimony of Michael Young, President,
University of Utah). Since Utah has moved up to the PAC [a first-class conference], President
Young might not be as concerned about correcting this wrong as he once was.
155.
Id. at 237.
See generally NCAA Tournament History, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.
156.
com/collegebasketball/ncaa-tournament/history (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
See id. (North Carolina was defending champion; Michigan State and Connecticut
157.
had won the championship within the prior six years.)
158.
Graham Meyer, Fast Times at George Mason U, WASHINGTONIAN, Apr. 1, 2007,
http://www.washingtonian.com/articlesleducation/3839.html.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
162.
Duke-Butler NCAA Final Generates Highest TV Rating Since 2005, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/collegesports/2011540368_mhoop07.html.
Id.
163.
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exclaimed that, "Upstart VCU crashes Final Four gate." 16 4 The story
noted that they "pulled a George Mason on Sunday, blowing out
top-seeded Kansas."165 In the end, Butler made its second straight
appearance in the finals only to lose again, this time to the University
of Connecticut.1 66 While the TV ratings for the final were down in
2011, they still exceeded the 2006 finals (UCLA and Florida), the 2008
finals (Kansas and Memphis), and the 2009 finals (Michigan and
Connecticut).16 1
There could be Cinderellas from I-AA football, too. Despite the
huge stadiums and the large scholarship differentials, I-AA teams are
beginning to compete favorably on the football field. For I-A schools,
the NCAA allows one game against a I-AA school to count toward I-A
postseason bowl eligibility, 168 and I-A teams sometimes schedule them
as warm-up cannon fodder at the beginning of the season. But when
then fifth-ranked Michigan fell to I-AA Appalachian State in 2007,169
it might have been difficult to convince Michigan's fans that the
Mountaineers were cannon fodder. Michigan's close 42-37 win over
I-AA Massachusetts in 2010170 might even convince these fans it
would be a good idea to get this cannon fodder off their schedule.
There were more than close calls in 2010. Division I-AA
Jacksonville State defeated Ole Miss, 171 and North Dakota State
defeated Kansas. 172 The big one, however, was James Madison
defeating then thirteenth-ranked Virginia Tech.173
Journalist Jeff Sagarin of USA Today produces an annual
strength of schedule ranking of Division I teams 174 that college football

164.

Mike Wise, Upstart VCU Crashes Final Four Gate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2011, at

Al.
Id.
165.
Connecticut Wins Third National Title Thanks to Butler's Woeful Shooting, ESPN
166.
(Apr. 4, 2011), http://espn.go.com/ncb/recap?gameld=31094004 1.
167.
Andrew Sharp, NCAA Championship Game TV Ratings: Down From 2010, But Far
Too High, SBNATION.COM (Apr. 5, 2011, 1:25 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2011-ncaatournament/2011/4/5/2092332/ncaa-championship-201 1-tv-ratings-butler-uconn.
168.
Amy Daughters, Should FBS us. FCS Games Be Banned Permanently?, BLEACHER
REP. (Sept. 28, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/475339.
169.
Bob Long, The Power of the FCS, BOB LONG'S SPORTS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://
bobsportsblog.wordpress.com/2010/09/20/the-power-of-the-fcs.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Matt Tait, North Dakota State Stuns Jayhawks, 6-3, KUSPORTS.COM (Sept. 4, 2010,
11:39 PM), http://www2.kusports.comlnews/20 10/sep/04/north-dakota-state-stuns-jayhawks-6-3.
173.
Long, supra note 169.
174.
Jeff Sagarin NCAA Football Rankings, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/sagarin/fbt09.htm ("The schedule ratings represent what the rating would
have to be for a hypothetical team to have a mathematical expectation of winning precisely 50%
of their games against the schedule played by the team in question .... ).
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fans widely watch. His year-end ranking of 245 teams in 2009 placed
I-AA Villanova at number thirty ahead of schools like Florida State,
West Virginia, Oklahoma State, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Notre
Dame; William and Mary at number forty-nine ahead of schools like
UCLA, Texas A&M, Missouri, and Michigan State; and Montana and
Richmond at numbers fifty-seven and sixty, respectively, ahead of
schools like Arizona State, Kansas State, Michigan, and Maryland.
The public should give I-AA football its due. It has produced
more than its fair share of star professionals like Jerry Rice, Brandon
Jacobs, Brock Marion, Kurt Warner, Terrell Owens, Gary Clark,
Richard Dent, Phil Simms, Randy Moss, Steve McNair, Tony Romo,
Rich Gannon, and Joe Flaco. 175 In fact, College Sporting News
reported that, "a claim can be made that a team of FCS all-time
all-stars could compete with a team of FBS all-stars in terms of
notoriety and performance at the professional level." 176 In spite of this
talent, I-AA still gets the Rodney Dangerfield treatment. Sports
analyst Bob Long said:
FCS [Football Championship Subdivision] football does not get the respect it deserves
for the talent it produces and the success it has against the FBS [Football Bowl
Subdivision]. For years the public has neglected the quality of the FCS, but this
ignorance is beginning to fade. The many FCS victories over FBS opponents are no
longer upsets, they will become more prevalent as the playing field becomes even more
level. It has been proven that FCS programs have caught up to many FBS football
programs in terms of recruiting and success. It has been shown that many FCS teams
have played well against and defeated quality FBS teams in 2009 and 2010. Fans will
be reluctant to accept the fact that the FCS is in fact extremely competitive, but given
the rapid increase in the quality of play, people need to begin to give it more respect. 177

Long says the reason for this coming parity is that:
High school football has expanded across the country and has produced many more
talented players than ever before. The quality of the top high school players in the
country has not drastically improved, but the number of talented players has increased
greatly. This trend has created a surplus of quality talent across the high school football
1 78
circuit.

In agreement, Adam Miller of the Daily Collegian said, "[t]he
bottom line is that the margin between the FBS and the FCS is much
smaller than it used to be and that difference will only continue to
shrink... . As the FBS is finding out, these so called 'second-rate
programs' have first-rate talent." 179 But I-AA schools are owed more
175.
1978 to 2008: The FCS Top Thirty Lists, C. SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 18, 2008), http://
www.championshipsubdivisionnews.com/log/index.php/2008/12/18/1978-to-2008-the-fcs-topthirty-lists?blog-5.
176.
Id.
177.
Long, supra note 169.
178.
Id.
179.
Adam Miller, Gap Between FBS and FCS Schools Closing, MASS. DAILY COLLEGIAN,
Sept. 21, 2010, http://dailycollegian.com/2010/09/21/gap-between-fbs-and-fcs-schools-closing.
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than respect. They are owed the opportunity to compete in first-tier
conferences and in postseason I-A bowl games instead of the
money-losing1 80 I-AA playoffs. If, in these changing times, Division
I-A is allowed to solve its financial problems without including I-AA
schools in the solution, many of these schools will have to follow in the
footsteps of Northeastern and Hofstra and cut their football programs
altogether.
College football is survival of the fittest. And the sixty-one
teams that formed the CFA and used it to devour the smaller schools
had no trouble devouring the CFA itself after it served its useful
purpose. Initially, the CFA did an excellent job coercing the NCAA
into reforming its legislative process and into forming a separate
Division I-A. It continued its good work by causing Oklahoma and
Georgia to file an antitrust suit against the NCAA, which the CFA
schools won.181 It also negotiated TV contracts for I-A football
programs between 1984 and 1996.182 However, in 1990 Penn State
pulled out of the CFA, and Notre Dame, finding it could get a better
TV contract deal on its own, left the cartel in 1991.183
In 1995, the SEC finally left the CFA, and the remaining
conferences followed suit. 184 With no more good work to do, the CFA
closed its doors in 1997.185 Its progeny, having learned well, continue
to thrive on television contracts. 186 As things stand today, the Big
East will pull in $200 million between now and 2013; the Big Twelve
will get $1.58 billion over the next thirteen years; the ACC will get
$1.86 billion over the next twelve years; the SEC's take will be $3.075
billion over the next fifteen years; the Big Ten will get $3.8 billion over
the next twenty-five years; and the Pac-Twelve has just signed a $3
billion twelve-year contract.1 87 This translates into annual revenue of
$45 million,18 8 $130 million, $155 million, $205 million, $220 million,
and $250 million to the Big East, Big Twelve, ACC, SEC, Big Ten, and

180.
Text of Jim O'Day's E-mail, supra note 40.
181.
John J. Siegfried & Molly Gardner Burba, The College Football Association
Television Broadcast Cartel 8-10, (Dep't of Econ., Vanderbilt Univ., Working Paper No. 03-W20,
2003), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu03-w20.pdf.
182.
Id. at 11-19.
183.
Id. at 29.
184.
Id. at 30.
185.
Id. at 31.
186.
See Brian Bennett, TV Deal, Not Expansion, Big East's Big Issue, ESPN C.
FOOTBALL NATION BLOG (May 5, 2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/ncfnation/post/_/id/41660.
187.
Id.
188.
Mike Casazza, Evaluating and Projecting Big East TV Deal, DAILY MAIL WVU
SPORTS BLOG (June 23, 2010, 12:37 PM), http://blogs.dailymail.com/wvul2010/06/23/evaluatingand-projecting-big-east-tv-deal.
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Pac-Twelve respectively.18 9 In addition, Notre Dame is still in its
relationship with NBC and, as a result, will reap $15 million a year
until 2015,190 and the University of Texas will soon be enjoying the
fruits of its $300 million twenty-year side deal with ESPN.191 One
writer explains that the root of these large television contracts is the
BCS because "[u]nder the BCS, power conferences are able to secure
much more lucrative [television] contracts, in part, because they
(unfairly) have a leg up on the other conferences in the pursuit for [sic]
the championship."1 9 2 While the power (first-class) conferences in
Division I-A have a leg up on the second-class conferences, both have a
leg up on I-AA schools that will never have an opportunity to enter
into these billion dollar contracts or play for the BCS championship.
Because of these disadvantages, I-AA schools need to take action to
even out the playing field.
III. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
After Oklahoma and Georgia won their antitrust suit in 1984,
the financial life of CFA schools improved immensely, but perhaps
things are coming full circle.193 Based on the precedent set in that
lawsuit, Senator Hatch, Boise State, and the Mountain West
Conference are now asking the DOJ to institute an antitrust case
against the BCS.194
The DOJ is still pondering these requests and has said it has
serious questions about whether the BCS is operating "consistent with
the competition principles expressed in the federal antitrust laws." 9 5
If the marginalized, second-class I-A conferences have an antitrust
case, the I-AA conferences have a better one. The five second-class I-A
conferences hauled in $24 million from the BCS in 2009, while I-AA
schools only received $1.8 million (approximately $15,000 per school)

189.
Report: PAC-12 Lands the Most Lucrative TV Deal in College Sports, SI.COM (May 3,
2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/ncaa/05/03/pac-10-tv.ap/index.html.
Richard Sandomir, NBC Still Likes its Notre Dame Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
190.
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/sports/ncaafootball/1lsandomir.html.
Texas, ESPN Announce New Network, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2011, 5:51 PV), http://sports.
191.
espn.go.comlespn/news/story?id=6037857.
192.
Brian Frederick, Congress Should Investigate Conference Realignment Decisions,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2011, 7:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-frederick/
conference-realig-nment-congress b 977995.html.
See Sally Jenkins, NCAA Lost its Teeth in Court in 1984, and No One's Been in
193.
Charge Since, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaalost-its-teeth-in-court-in-1984-and-no-ones-been-in-chargesincel20l1/09/23/gIQAVDyoqK story.
html.
See Feds to NCAA: Why No playoffs?, supra note 142.
194.
Id.
195.
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"to support the overall health of college football."19 6 And, since 2007,
eight teams from second-class I-A conferences have appeared in BCS
bowls19 7 while, of course, no I-AA team made an appearance.
Because the Supreme Court treats college football as a
business and the NCAA as a cartel subject to the Sherman Antitrust
Act,19 8 other associations such as the BCS, Division I-A, and
conferences like the Big Ten have to be mindful of the Act.

A. History and Structure of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act became law on July 2, 1890, and, as
amended, is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. The Wilson Tariff Act,
codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11, and the Clayton Act of 1914, codified, as
amended, in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, have expanded the original Act. 199
Section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 200 This
section only addresses concerted action (action taken by two or more
persons) that restrains trade. 201 Section 2 makes it a violation for any
person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize .

.

. trade or

commerce." 202

This section addresses both independent and concerted
action that "threatens actual monopolization." 203
Sections 1 and 2 provide for criminal sanctions 204 as well as
civil remedies. 205 Criminal matters, of course, only the DOJ
prosecutes. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ may
enforce civil sanctionS206 in the form of restraining orders and
injunctions, 207 seek up to treble damages when the antitrust action
injures the United States, 208 and seek interest on actual damages. 209

196.
BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2009-10, supra note 121, at 13.
197.
BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11, supra note 111, at 48; Feinstein, supra note 21.
198.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 96 (1984).
199.
See generally ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL
(4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanuallatrdivman.pdf.
200.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
201.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
202.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
203.
Copperweld, 467 U.S at 767.
204.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. These sections provide that in the event of conviction, a defendant
that is a corporation could be fined up to $100 million, and a defendant that is an individual may
be fined up to $1 million, or imprisoned for up to ten years, or both. Id.
205.
15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.
206.
Id. § 4.
207.
See id.
208.
Id. § 15a.

209.

Id.
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They may also seek recovery of litigation costs. 2 10 As a general rule,
the FTC does not have jurisdiction over the nonprofit sector; however,
it does have jurisdiction if a nonprofit is organized to carry on
business on behalf of its for-profit members. 211
Private individuals who believe they have been, or will be,
injured by violations of antitrust laws can also pursue civil
sanctions. 2 12 They can obtain injunctions, restraining orders, 213 up to
treble damages for injuries sustained, court costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees. 2 14 In addition, a state attorney general may bring civil
actions on behalf of any natural person residing in her state. 2 15
When considering an antitrust lawsuit, the foregoing
legislation is the first place to look. Nevertheless, a litigant must also
consult case law because:
From the beginning the [Supreme] Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute. ("In antitrust, the federal courts ... act more as common-law courts than in
other areas governed by federal statute"). Just as the common law adapts to modern
understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition on
2 16
"restraint[s] of trade" evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.

For example, while not in the statute, common law makes it
clear the Sherman Act was meant to prohibit only unreasonable
restraints of trade, 2 17 and was not written to protect individual
competitors from harm. 218 Rather, legislators passed it to protect
competition. 219 Such restraint may be determined to be unreasonable
under either a per se or under a "rule of reason" standard. 220 Once a
court finds a practice to be illegal per se, no further inquiry by the
court is necessary. 221
210.
Id.
211.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1999).
212.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
213.
Id. § 26.
214.
Id. § 15(a).
215.
Id.§ 15c(a). Utah's Attorney General is planning to bring such a suit against the
BCS. Steve Wieberg & Kelly Whiteside, Utah Attorney General Says He Will File Antitrust
Lawsuit Against BCS, USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
football/2011-04-20-bcs-anti-trust-lawsuit N.htm.
216.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981)).
217.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990) (citing Cargill, Inc. v.
218.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986)).
219.
See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 139 (1998); Atl. Richfield Co.,
495 U.S. at 338; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
220.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)); see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
221.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100, 103 (1984).
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On the other hand, under the more demanding rule of reason
analysis, the court or jury determines whether an agreement merely
regulates and possibly promotes competition (reasonable), or whether
it suppresses or destroys competition (unreasonable). 2 2 2 If the court or
jury determines the agreement is unreasonable, the defendant then
has the opportunity to prove that it promotes competition, i.e., that it
is procompetitive. 223 This standard involves "shifting burdens of
proof."2 2 4 A plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the
agreement has a substantially adverse effect on competition. 22 5 If a
plaintiff can do this, the burden then shifts to the defendant to come
forward with any procompetitive virtues of the alleged unlawful
conduct. 226 Should the defendant establish this, then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff, who will prevail if she can establish that
the defendant could have achieved his objective through an
alternative, less restrictive means.227
The law requires a rule of reason analysis when the challenged
restraint "might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive
effect," 228 and presumes this analysis applies in cases brought under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 229 The function of the fact-finder is "to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint."230
Since Section 1 does not apply to the conduct of a single enterprise, 23 1
it does not prohibit "the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary" because the Act views both as a "single
enterprise." 232 However, joint ventures consisting of separate entities,
such as the NCAA and NFL, can violate Section 1.233 Finally,
unreasonable restraints of trade can take the form of horizontal pricefixing agreements, vertical price-fixing agreements, market division,

Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458 (1986) (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
222.
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
223.
224.
See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States
v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
225.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668.
226.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669.
227.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
228.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).
229.
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
230.
Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
231.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770-71 (1984).
232.
Id. at 771.
233.
See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206-07 (2010); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99, 113 (1984). But see Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.
1, 5 (2006).
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boycotts, 234
agreements.237

group

bid

rigging, 235

monopolies, 236

and

tying

B. The NCAA's Interactionwith the Sherman Act Thus Far
With the NCAA's emphasis on promoting equity among
competing schools and the Sherman Act's emphasis on preventing
unreasonable restraints of trade, the two concepts were bound to
collide. The collision course began in the 1950s when some schools
believed that football games televised by the University of
Pennsylvania hurt their gate attendance. 238 As a result, they turned
to the NCAA for relief.2 39
In response, the NCAA asked a research firm to determine
whether television was likely to have a negative impact on "live
gate."2 4 0 When the firm concluded it would, the NCAA devised a plan
limiting the number of games member institutions could televise, and
the NCAA membership approved the plan. 24 1 Thereafter, pursuant to
a vote of member institutions, the NCAA took control of college
football television rights and formed a committee that devised
television contract plans. 24 2 Schools followed contracts formulated by
this committee for about thirty years until a group of larger schools
became dissatisfied with their restricted television appearances and
the revenue distribution. 2 4 3
This dissatisfaction, described above, caused two schools to file
an antitrust suit against the NCAA on September 8, 1981.244 The suit
alleged that the pending 1982-85 contracts with ABC, CBS, and
Turner were in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 2 4 5 and
also moved for relief from sanctions threatened by the NCAA. 24 6 The

234.
235.
236.
237.
(1949).
238.
1982).
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1998).
Nat'1 Soc'y ofProf'1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-93.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1956).
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (StandardStations), 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1283 (W.D. Okla.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1291-92.
Id. at 1286.
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court granted the motion for relief the day the plaintiffs filed the
suit. 247
Then, after a lengthy bench trial on the merits, the US District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found the NCAA's conduct
amounted to a per se horizontal price-fixing agreement among
competitors in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a per se
boycott of the television networks in violation of Section 1, and
monopolization of the college football television market in violation of
section 2.248 The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the per se finding of horizontal price-fixing and reversed the boycott
and monopoly findings. 249 The NCAA appealed, and the Supreme
Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
affirmed but, for reasons explained below, used a rule of reason rather
than a per se analysis. 250
In determining whether the trial and appellate courts correctly
applied the per se standard, Justice Stephens, writing for the Court,
reasoned that the law had traditionally treated horizontal price-fixing
as per se illegal because the practice facially appears to restrict
competition and decrease output. 2 5 1 He added that courts had made
exceptions for price-fixing agreements that might actually increase
competition in limited markets. 252 The Court held that the instant
case represented one of those exceptionS 253 because the NCAA was in
an industry where horizontal restraintS254 on competition were
essential if the product (contests between competing institutions) was
to be available at all. 2 55 Therefore, the lower courts should have
followed a rule of reason analysis. 2 5 6 The majority then proceeded to
utilize precedent and evidence before the district court to render its
holding under the rule of reason analysis. 257
Before the Court, the NCAA argued that, in order to establish
that the alleged restraint was anticompetitive, the plaintiffs had failed
247.
Id.
248.
Id. at 1281-82.
249.
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1983);
see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 125 (1984).
250.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88, 100-01.
251.
Id. at 100 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979)).
252.
Id. at 103 (citing Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 18-23; Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977)).
253
Id. at 101-02.
254.
A horizontal restraint is an "agreement between competitors at the same level of the
market structure." Evans v. S. S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1976).
255.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
256.
Id. at 99-101.
257.
Id. at 111-21.
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to prove that the NCAA had "market power." 258 Moreover, the NCAA
contended they did not, in fact, have market power because
advertisers and broadcasters could have switched from college football
The Court rejected both
to other types of entertainment. 259
260
as a matter of law
first
argument
It rejected the
arguments.
because "no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of . .. an agreement" 26 1 when "there is an
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output."2 62
With regard to the second argument, the Court held:
[Tihe District Court's market analysis is firmly supported by our decision in
InternationalBoxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, that championship boxing
events are uniquely attractive to fans and hence constitute a market separate from that
for non-championship events. Thus, respondents have demonstrated that there is a
separate market for telecasts of college football which "[rests] on generic qualities
differentiating" viewers. It inexorably follows that if college football broadcasts be
defined as a separate market-and we are convinced they are-then the NCAA's
complete control over those broadcasts provides a solid basis for the District Court's
conclusion that the NCAA possesses market power with respect to those broadcasts.
"When a product is controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the
263
market, there is monopoly power."

The NCAA next argued that their television contract was
procompetitive and therefore justified because it protected "live-gate"
attendance of other college football games, which was necessary since
their ticket sales could not compete with football telecasts (output).2 6 4
The Court found that this contention was based on the NCAA's fear
that live football (the product) would not be attractive enough to draw
attendance when faced with competition from televised games. 265 The
Court concluded this argument was unpersuasive because "[t]he Rule

258.
Id. at 109. Market power refers to "the power to control prices or exclude
competition," United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 344 F.3d. 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)), and the "ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market," Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at
109 n.38.
259.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111.
Id. at 109.
260.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
261.
262.
Id. The NCAA's plan restricted output (games on television) and raised prices the
networks had to pay, thereby creating a price structure that was unresponsive to viewer
demand. Id. at 105-06.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111-12 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
263.
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394
(1956); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953)) (citing Int'l Boxing
Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-52 (1959)).
264.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 116.
Id.
265.
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of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable." 26 6
After Board of Regents, the large football powers became the
major recipients of TV money, causing the NCAA even more concern
about the competitive balance of intercollegiate athletics. 2 6 7 A 1985
study known as the Raiborn Report confirmed this concern. 268
According to this study, expenses of athletic programs increased more
than 100 percent between 1978 and 1985, and 42 percent of NCAA
Division I schools had deficits in their overall athletic budgets, with an
average deficit of $824,000 per school. 269 In addition, "some college
presidents had to close academic departments, fire tenured faculty,
and reduce the number of sports offered to students due to economic
constraints." 270 The study further found that, in many cases, the
economic constraints were due to pressures to "keep up with the
Joneses" by increasing spending on recruiting talented players and
coaches and on other aspects of their sports programs. 27 1
Therefore, in 1989, the NCAA established a Cost Reduction
Committee to consider ways of reducing the cost of intercollegiate
athletics "without disturbing the competitive balance." 2 7 2 Before work
began, the committee chairman sent a letter to all participants
thanking them for joining together in a "gigantic attempt to save
intercollegiate athletics from itself."2 73 In the end, the committee
made a number of recommendations, one of which was to reduce the
salaries of all part-time assistant coaches, graduate assistant coaches,
and volunteer coaches by reclassifying them as "restricted-earnings
coaches" and paying them no more than $16,000 a year. 2 74 In support
of this recommendation, the committee noted that personnel costs
constituted the largest expense item in athletic budgets. 275 NCAA
members adopted the committee's recommendation, and it became
effective in the 1992-93 academic year. 2 7 6
Not surprisingly, "restricted-earnings basketball coaches,"
some of whom had been making $60,000 to $70,000 a year, took a dim

266.
(1978)).
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 116-17 (citing Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id.
Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
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view of this pay cut and filed a class-action price-fixing suit against
the NCAA. 2 7 7 In Law v. NCAA, the US District Court for the District
of Kansas used a rule of reason analysis and found as a matter of law
that the salary restriction was in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 2 7 8 By way of summary judgment, the district court found for the
plaintiffs on the issue of liability 2 7 9 and enjoined the NCAA from
further enforcement of restricted-earnings salaries. 280
On appeal, the NCAA argued that the coaches had not carried
their burden of establishing that a relevant market existed, and that
they had not shown that they (the NCAA) had power in the market. 8 '
In support of this argument, the NCAA contended the relevant market
was made up of all college basketball coaches, and presented evidence
showing that restricted-earnings basketball coaches only consisted of
8 percent of that market. 282 Accordingly, the NCAA argued that an
issue of material fact existed and that the summary judgment was

inappropriate. 2 8 3
In rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit pointed to Board
of Regents where the court said:
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked
restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an agreement not to
compete in terms of price or output no elaborate industry analysis is required to
2 84
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.

Accordingly, the court found that it was proper for the trial judge to
determine the anticompetitive effects of the bylaw under a "quick
look" 285 analysis and proceed directly to the question of whether the

277.
See Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995), aff'd, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.
1998).
Id. at 1409-10.
278.
Id. at 1410.
279.
280.
Law v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3479, at *14-15 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1996).
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
281.
282.
Id. at 1019-20.
Id. at 1020.
283.
Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984)).
284.
Id. The Court has expanded on the circumstances in which a "quick look" is
285.
appropriate. See generally Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999). In NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that a "naked restraint
on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed
market analysis." 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984). Later, the Court held that "no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character," Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978), of "horizontal agreements among competitors to refuse
to discuss prices," Cal. Dental Assn, 526 U.S. at 770 (citing Nat'l Socy' of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S.
at 692), or "to withhold a particular desired service," Cal. Dental Assn, 526 U.S. at 770 (citing
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 459 (1986)).
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what has come to be called
abbreviated or 'quick-look' analysis under the rule of reason, an observer with even a
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procompetitive justifications advanced by the NCAA outweighed the
restraints. 286 Contending the bylaw was procompetitive, the NCAA
argued that it helped retain entry-level coaching positions, reduced
costs, and provided competitive equity by preventing wealthier schools
from employing more experienced, higher-priced coaches as part-time
coaches.287
Unconvinced, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that retaining
coaching positions might have social value but did not promote
competition. 288 Furthermore, the court held that "cost-cutting by itself
is not a valid procompetitive justification. If it were, any group of
competing buyers could agree on maximum prices [they would
pay]."289 Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the restriction was not
procompetitive because the Cost-Reduction Committee implemented
these wage limitations to prevent disturbing the competitive
balance.290
Because the evidence established that the salary restriction
constituted a price-fixing agreement and that the NCAA had not
established the agreement was procompetitive, the district court's
order was affirmed. 291 In April 1998, the parties litigated the liability
and damage issues and a jury awarded the coaches $22 million, which
became $66 million after treble damages. 292 The parties subsequently
settled the lawsuit for $54 million. 293 In addition, the court awarded
the defense attorneys $20 million in fees and costs. 2 94
Picking up on the portion of Law in which the court held that
"cost-cutting by itself is not a valid pro-competitive justification," 295 a
group of walk-on football players from different I-A schools also filed

rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.
Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770; see Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 (finding a
horizontal agreement among dentists to refuse to submit X-rays to dental insurers); Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 99-100 (finding NCAA's television plan explicitly restricted output and fixed
a minimum price); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (concluding the restraint was "an
absolute ban on competitive bidding").
286
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
287.
Id. at 1021, 1024.
288.
Id. at 1022.
Id.
289.
290.
Id. at 1013, 1024 (explaining that the stated purpose of the Cost Reduction
Committee was to reduce the costs of intercollegiate athletics "without disturbing the
competitive balance").
291.
Id. at 1020.
292.
Law v. NCAA, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195 (D. Kan. 2000), affd 134 F.3d 1010 (10th
Cir. 1998).
Id.
293.
294Id. at 1193.
295.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1022.

2012]

ANTITRUST AND NCAA FOOTBALL

311

suit against the NCAA. 296 In In re NCAA I-A Walk-on Football
Players Litigation, the walk-ons contended before the US District
Court for the Western District of Washington that the NCAA bylaw
restricting I-A schools to eighty-five football scholarships was a
horizontal "cost-containment" agreement in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 297 The NCAA moved for judgment on the pleadings
contending that the walk-ons had not alleged a legally cognizable
relevant market or injury to competition. 29 8 The district court, in
denying the motion, found the plaintiffs' pleading did state a cause of
action in that it alleged an "input" market where schools competed for
skilled amateur football players and that it alleged injury to
competition by contending that "many walk-ons leave school with
enormous student loans that they must pay off after they leave
school." 299
The parties settled the lawsuit in 2007 when the plaintiffs
"walked away" with an extremely small amount of money. 300 The
NCAA considered this settlement a victory, 30 1 and they still limit I-A
schools to eighty-five football scholarships and I-AA schools to
sixty-three. 302
C. FutureAntitrust Suits against the NCAA and the Boycott Theory
In Board of Regents and Law, the Supreme Court and the
Tenth Circuit, respectively, held that the NCAA had violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act because it had engaged in horizontal price-fixing
arrangements that did not increase "competitive equity among NCAA
teams."3 0 3 When it comes to a potential antitrust suit by the secondclass I-A conferences against the BCS, academics have suggested that
the "boycott theory" provides the greatest likelihood of success.30 4 The
same can be said about an antitrust suit by I-AA schools whether they

See In re NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D.
296.
Wash. 2005).
Id. at 1146-47.
297.
Id. at 1147.
298.
299.
Id. at 1150-51 (quoting Complaint at 26 n.79, In re NCAA I-A Walk-on Football
Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (No. C-04-1254-C), 2004 U.S. Dist. Ct.
Pleadings 1650).
300.
Mark Alesia, 3 Lawsuits May Change How NCAA Operates, USA TODAY, July 26,
2009, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-07-26-ncaa-lawsuitsN.htm.
Id.
301.
302.
2010-11 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 104, § 15.5.6.
303.
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998).
C. Paul Rogers III, The Quest for Number One in College Football:The Revised Bowl
304.
Championship Series, Antitrust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
285, 286 n.9 (2008).
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label the theory a boycott, a concerted refusal to deal, or a conspiracy
among federation members. Boycotts, concerted refusals to deal,30 5
and conspiracies among federation memberS306 come in different
shapes and forms; some violate Section 1 per se while others do not.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,307 ten appliance
manufacturers agreed, at the instigation of Broadway-Hale (a national
chain), that they would not sell, or would only sell at higher prices and
unfavorable terms, to one of Broadway-Hale's competitors doing
business as Klor's. 308 As a result, Klor's, a solely-owned company,
brought an antitrust suit against Broadway-Hale and the
manufacturers seeking treble damages and an injunction claiming
that the agreement was in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 309 Broadway-Hale moved for summary judgment, and the court
agreed and dismissed the complaint finding that "[tihe controversy
was a 'purely private quarrel' between [the parties], which did not
310
amount to a 'public wrong proscribed by the Sherman Act."'
In affirming the dismissal, the US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit said there was no proof that Broadway-Hale's actions
adversely affected the price, quantity, or quality of goods offered to the
public.3 1 1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari; Justice Black
explained: "The holding, if correct, means .

.

. a group of powerful

businessmen may act in concert to deprive a single merchant, like
Klor, of the goods he needs to compete effectively." 3 12 Reviewing this
hypothesis, Justice Black observed that the landmark Standard Oil
case held that the validity of an agreement depends on the
surrounding circumstances and that some classes of restraints are
unduly restrictive. 313 The Court then said, in reversing, that "[g]roup
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden category." 314
This holding seems to imply that a boycott agreement is itself
an injury to the competitive proceSS315 and that once a court deemed
an agreement to be part of a "group boycott," it normally resulted in

305.
306.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 540, 552-53 (1978).
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455 (1986).

307.

359 U.S. 207 (1959).

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 210 (discussing the district court's decision).
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 230 (9th Cir. 1958).
Klor's, 359 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 211 (citing Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-65 (1911)).
Id. at 212.
See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1998).
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However, twenty-six years later, Justice
per se invalidation. 3 16
Brennan, writing for the Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Company, said that the type of boycott
activity meriting per se treatment was far from certain,317 explaining
that the Court had generally limited the per se approach to "joint
efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by 'either
directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to
deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive
318
struggle."'
In Northwest Stationers, members of a cooperative (Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc.), for no stated reason, kicked another
member (Pacific Stationery and Printing Company) out of the
cooperative without notice, explanation, or hearing.3 1 9 This put Pacific
at a disadvantage because, even though nonmember and member
retailers could purchase supplies from Northwest at the same price,
members received year-end rebates. 320 Moreover, members, unlike
nonmembers, could use Northwest's warehouse. 321
Thereafter, Pacific brought suit alleging that its expulsion
amounted to a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 2 2 The
trial court rejected the per se analysis, holding instead that a rule of
reason analysis should govern. 323 After applying this analysis, the
court found the expulsion had no anticompetitive effect and granted
summary judgment for Northwest. 324 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that "[tihe uncontroverted facts ... support[ed] a finding of
per se liability."325
The Supreme Court, however, rejected an automatic
application of the per se analysis in this boycott:
A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a threshold case that the
challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompetitive
See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1963); N. Pac. Ry.
316.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 287
317.
(1985).
318.

Id. at 294 (quoting LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 261-62 (1977)).

Id. at 287.
319.
Id. at 286.
320.
Id. The court noted that Northwest's activity did not really amount to a "concerted
321.
refusal to deal" but rather it amounted to "a concerted refusal to deal with Pacific on
substantially equal terms." Id. at 295 n.6. "Such activity might justify per se invalidation if it
placed a competing firm at a severe competing disadvantage." Id. (noting that even if the joint
venture does deal with outside firms, it may place them at a severe competitive disadvantage).
322.
Id. at 288.
323.
Pac. Stationery & Printing Co. v. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393,
1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the trial court's disposition of the case).
324.
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 288.
Pac. Stationery & PrintingCo., 715 F.2d at 1395.
325.
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effects. The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to deal does not
all concerted refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive.
challenges expulsion from a joint buying cooperative, some showing
the cooperative possesses market power or unique access to a
necessary for effective competition.
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suffice because not
When the plaintiff
must be made that
business element

326

Because Pacific had not shown that Northwest possessed "market
power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective
competition," the Court reversed the judgment and remanded to the
circuit court for the limited purpose of determining whether the trial
court's rule of reason analysis was correct. 327
Next, in a "boycott-type case" the Court held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to invoke the per se rule, but observed that the
defendant was required to prove her restraints were procompetitive
even though the plaintiff had not established market power. 328 In
IndianaFederationof Dentists, a group of dentists formed a federation
that initiated a policy prohibiting its members from furnishing patient
x-rays to insurance companies. 3 29 The Federation created this policy
to thwart insurance company requests for patient x-rays to assist in
the evaluation of insurance claims. 33 0 After a hearing, the FTC found,
under the rule of reason analysis, that the Federation's policy
constituted unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 45 (in other
words, an unreasonable restraint of trade) and issued a
cease-and-desist order. 331
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
vacated the order holding that there was insufficient evidence to
support the FTC's finding that the dentists conspired to withhold the
x-rays. 332 It also held that there was insufficient evidence to establish
that the Federation suppressed competition. 333 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the FTC's finding that the Federation's policy was
anticompetitive, and to consider whether the Seventh Circuit had
misconstrued the principles of antitrust law. 33 4
At the outset, the Court addressed the question of whether the
dentists' collective refusal to cooperate with the insurers constituted
an "unreasonable' restraint of trade" in violation of section 1 of the

326.

Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298.

327.

Id.

328.
329.

FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986).
Id. at 451.

330.

Id.

331.
332.
333.
334.

Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57 (1983) (final order).
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1135-38 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1143-44.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 453.
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Sherman Act. 335 In addressing the reasonableness of the policy,
Justice White, writing for the Court, concluded that the Federation's
practices resembled those that the Court had previously labeled
"group boycotts" because "the policy constitutes a concerted refusal to
deal." 33 6 He further concluded that, historically, group boycotts had
been found unreasonable per se. 337 He reasoned, however, that they
could not force the Federation's policy into a boycott pigeonhole and
the per se rule could not be invoked because, as the Court noted:
[I]n Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the category of restraints classed as group boycotts
[was] not to be expanded indiscriminately, and [that] the per se approach ha[d]
generally been limited to cases in which firms with market power [had] boycott[ed]
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a
33 8
competitor-a situation obviously not present here.

Next the Court examined whether the policy was unreasonable
under a rule of reason analysis, observing that "[tihe Federation's
policy takes the form of a horizontal agreement among the
participating dentists to withhold from their customers a particular
service they desire-the forwarding of x-rays to insurance companies
along with claim forms." 339 The Court added:
While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement. A refusal to compete
with respect to the package of services offered to customers, no less than a refusal to
compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the
market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and services
to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them. Absent
some countervailing procompetitive virtue-such as, for example, the creation of
efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision of goods and services-such an
agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the ordinary give and take of the
34 0
market place, cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.

countervailing
any
make
did not
Federation
The
procompetitive claims but did contend its policy was not an
unreasonable restraint as a matter of law. 34 1 It argued that the FTC's
rule of reason analysis was faulty because it failed to define the
allegedly trade-restrained market and the Federation members'
market power. 342 Rejecting this argument, Justice White said:
This contention ... runs counter to the Court's holding in [NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma] ... that "[als a matter of law, the absence of proof of

335.
336.

Id. at 457.
Id. at 458.

337.

Id.

Id. (citations omitted).
338.
Id. at 459.
339.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
340.
679, 692 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
341.
Id. at 460.

342.

Id.
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market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output," and that such a
restriction "requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed
343
market analysis."

In this way, while boycott cases do not get per se treatment, once
established, they are "naked" enough to dispense with the plaintiffs
need to prove market power before the defendant is required to come
forward with proof the alleged restraints are procompetitive.
He added that "even if the restriction imposed by the
Federation is not sufficiently 'naked' to call this principle into play,
the Commission's failure to engage in detailed market analysis is not
fatal to its finding of a violation of the Rule of Reason." 344 This was so,
he said, first, because the FTC found as a matter of fact the
Federation's policy had an adverse effect on competition and second,
[s]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output," can
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a "surrogate for
34 5
detrimental effects."

In reversing, the Court said that substantial evidence supported the
FTC's findings and these findings were sufficient as a matter of law to
establish a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 4 6
College
basketball's
postseason
National
Invitational
Tournament (NIT) successfully employed the boycott theory against
the NCAA in Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association v.
NCAA. 347 In this case, Metro Intercollegiate Basketball Association
(MIBA)348 filed suit against the NCAA, alleging that its bylaw
required "any NCAA institution invited to the NCAA Tournament to
boycott the Postseason NIT." 34 9 Here the NIT challenged a bylaw that
required member institutions invited to the post-season NCAA
tournament to either participate in the NCAA tournament or forgo
postseason competition altogether. 350

343.

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984)).
344.

Id.

345.

Id. at 460-61 (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW

1511 (1986)).

346.
Id. at 465-66.
347.
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding successful plaintiffs' use of boycott theory to challenge NCAA bylaw).
348.
The Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association is an unincorporated
association consisting of Fordham University, Manhattan College, New York University, St.
John's University, and Wagner College. See id. at 565-66.
349.
Id. at 569.
350.

Id.
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After filing suit, the MIBA moved for summary judgment
contending the bylaw was unreasonable per se. 3 5 1 The district court
rejected this contention. 352 It reasoned that Board of Regents made
clear that a per se analysis would not be appropriate when sports
activities were involved because these activities could only be carried
out jointly thereby making certain horizontal restraints necessary. 3 53
Therefore, in order to prevail, the Court found that the MIBA would
have to proceed with its motion for summary judgment under a rule of
reason analysis. 354 Since the MIBA did not argue it was entitled to
summary judgment under a rule of reason analysis, its motion was
denied. 355 The case went to trial in August 2005.356 The parties
settled after two weeks of litigation when the NCAA agreed to pay $16
million to end the trial and $40.5 million to purchase the NIT
tournament. 357
IV. THE SHERMAN OPTION

Senator Hatch and Arent Fox LLP partner Alan Fisher, who
represents Boise State and the Mountain West Conference, have
urged the DOJ to file an antitrust lawsuit against the BCS. 358 The
DOJ has taken these requests under consideration. 3 5 9 While the
second-class I-A conferences have a grievance, the 120 I-AA schools
have the greatest likelihood of succeeding in an antitrust case.
A. Theory of the I-AA case
The theory of this case is twofold. 360 First, Division I-A football
schools, their conferences, and the NCAA have conspired with each
other to keep I-AA schools from competing at the highest level of
Division I football. They have done this through forbidden boycotts. 36 1

Id. at 570.
351.
Id. at 571.
352.
Id. at 570-71 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101
353.
(1984)).
Id. at 573.
354.
Id.
355.
356.
Frank Litksy, N.C.A.A. Buys N.I.T. for $56.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/sports/ncaabasketball/18nit.html.
Id.
357.
358.
See Hatch Press Release, supra note 119; Jenkins, supra note 129.
See Feds to NCAA: Why No Playoffs?, supra note 142.
359.
There could also be a third monopoly theory involving the BCS, but it is not
360.
addressed here.
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (noting that
361.
group boycotts-or concerted refusals to deal with others-have long been forbidden).
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This exclusion, through a group boycott, impedes the ordinary give
and take of the market place by lowering the quality of the product
and by increasing the cost of doing business, which the schools pass on
to consumers (the fans). Both features of the boycott unreasonably
restrain competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Second, participants in the BCS (Division I-A schools and the
BCS arrangement) have conspired with each other through a group
boycott to exclude I-AA schools from the arrangement. Again, an
examination of the facts under the rule of reason analysis establishes
that I-A conferences manage the BCS, which specifically excludes all
I-AA schools from participating in their postseason arrangement.
This boycott also "limit[s] consumer choice by impeding the 'ordinary
give and take of the market place"' 3 62 and, therefore, unreasonably
restrains competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As a result, I-AA competitors have been, and continue to be,
harmed by the loss of revenue and intangible benefits that come from
competing at the highest level of NCAA Division I football. The
remedies would include injunctions from the court such as: (1) barring
further mandatory separation of NCAA Division I football programs
into I-A and I-AA categories, and (2) barring further exclusion from
postseason BCS and NCAA Division I-A bowls, and (2) a monetary
award for past exclusions (within the four-year statutory period 363 )
against all defendants including treble damages, court costs, and
attorneys' fees.
B. Method of Proof
When a boycott theory is used to prove an antitrust violation,
the per se analysis (as opposed to the more stringent rule of reason
analysis) may be used to establish the violation if the defendant has
market power and boycotts "suppliers or customers in order to
discourage them from doing business with a competitor."3 64 Since the
alleged boycott in this case was not employed to discourage a supplier
or customer from doing business with a competitor, the rule of reason
analysis must be used to prove the violation. It is arguable, however,
that the plaintiff in this case3 65 can use a "quick look" rule of reason
analysis (dispensing with the need to prove market power) because it
has been said that a boycott, once established, is "naked enough" to

362.
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
363.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006).
364.
See Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458.
365.
The plaintiff(s) in this case being one or more I-AA institutions.
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prove the restraint is unreasonable. 366 However, out of an abundance
of caution, this plaintiff will establish that the defendants had market
power.
C. The Law: Jury Instructions
At the conclusion of a jury trial in an antitrust boycott case, the
jury would receive a number of instructions from the bench.
Using ABA Model instructions as a guide, and assuming the
NCAA and the BCS are the defendants, 367 tailored instructions
regarding the plaintiffs denial of membership claim might look like
the following:
1. Exclusion from an Association
Persons who are in competition with each other in an industry,
trade, or profession may lawfully join together in an association for
the purpose of promoting legitimate goals such as product quality,
safety standards, consumer confidence, or other interests of the
industry, trade, or profession. To accomplish its goals, such an
association will usually have to make and enforce rules and
If those rules are reasonably
requirements for participation.
necessary to accomplish a procompetitive purpose, they can be applied
However, if the association's rules
without violating the law.
significantly impair competition in a relevant market without a
legitimate justification, the use of those rules to exclude [another
person or organization] violates the Sherman Act. 368
To prevail on its claim that the defendants' boycott constituted
such a violation, the plaintiff must prove each of the following
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 369
First. That a defendant possessed market power. 370 In
determining whether a defendant has market power in this case you
are instructed that, "college football constitutes a separate market for
which there is no reasonable substitute."37 1 A defendant has market
power within this market if it has the "power to control prices or

366.
See lnd. Fedn of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460.
There are other potential defendants such as I-A schools and first-class I-A
367.
conferences, but for the purposes of this discussion the defendants have been limited to the
NCAA and the BCS.
368.
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].

§

B-57 (2005) [hereinafter

§ B-58.

369.

Id.

370.

Id.

371.

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 n.48 (1984).
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exclude competition." 3 72 Or, in the alternative, "market power may be
presumed if [a] defendant controls a large enough share of the
relevant market."373
Second. That the restriction on membership is not reasonably
necessary or tailored to achieve the defendant's legitimate goals.
Third. That the defendant's denial of membership affects
interstate commerce.
Fourth. That the plaintiff was injured in its business or
property because of this denial of membership.
If you find that the evidence is insufficient to prove any one or
more of these elements, as to a particular defendant then you must
find for that defendant. If you find that the evidence is sufficient to
prove all four elements as to a defendant, then you must find for the
plaintiff and against that particular defendant on the plaintiffs denial
of membership claim. 3 7 4
2. Rule of Reason Overview
"Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a restraint of trade is
illegal only if it is found to be unreasonable." 3 7 5 You must determine
whether the agreements challenged here are unreasonable.
In
making this determination, you must first determine whether the
plaintiff has proven that its exclusion from the first tier of Division I
football (Division I-A) in the NCAA and from the BCS arrangement
resulted in substantial harm to competition in a relevant product and
geographic market.
"If you find that the plaintiff has proven that the challenged
restraint results in . .. substantial harm to competition in a relevant
market, then you must consider whether the [defendant has
established that the] restraint produces countervailing competitive
benefits." 376 If you find the defendant has established that the
restraint produces countervailing competitive benefits, "then you must
balance the competitive harm against the competitive benefit." 377 A
challenged restraint is illegal only if you find that competitive harm
substantially outweighs competitive benefits. 378

372.
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38; United States v. E.I.du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
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Id.
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D. ClosingArgument
Ladies and gentlemen we thank you for your time and
attention during the course of this long trial. What I am going to do
now is pull all of the testimony and documents together and show you
why there is a wrong that must be made right. As you have seen from
the evidence, college sports, rightly or wrongly is big business, and as
you have also seen, many I-A colleges and most, if not all, I-AA
colleges are finding it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain their
Unfortunately, the watchdog Knight
athletic programs.3 7 9
Commission, Congress, the Department of Justice, and scholars are
only concentrating on the problems facing I-A schools. 380 However,
120 I-AA football schools in NCAA Division 1381 have problems too,
and a resolution of these problems is long overdue. This is something
you can remedy.
At the conclusion of closing arguments, the judge will instruct
you on the law, and at that time you will be told that in order for my
client to prevail you will have to find that the defendants have market
power. We have introduced evidence here to establish the market is
college football for which you will be instructed there is no reasonable
substitute.
To prove the defendants have power in this market we have
introduced evidence showing that college athletic competition is
conducted in three separate divisions (Divisions I, II, and III) under
the control of the NCAA. 382 We have also introduced evidence showing
that the NCAA has divided college football in Division I into two
groups known as Divisions I-A and I-AA, 3 83 and that in order to
participate in I-A's postseason a school may only count one victory
against a I-AA opponent as a win against a "deserving team." 384 When
it comes to the BCS, we introduced evidence specifically establishing
the arrangement's requirement that its contestants come from
Division I-A.38 5
These restraints prevent I-AA schools from playing football
games in most of I-A's regular season, and they prevent them from

379.

REVENUES & EXPENSES supra note 19.

380.

See KNIGHT COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 4; DOJ Mulls

Antitrust Probe of College Football Championships, supra note 141; Hatch Press Release, supra
note 119.
381.

REVENUES & EXPENSES, supra note 19, at 54.

382.

GRANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 40 (noting that Division I split into I-A and I-AA in

1978).

383.
384.
385.

NCAA, 2010-11 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 20.1.1.2.
Id. at §18.7.2.2.1.
BowL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, supra note 111 at 8-9.
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participating in postseason NCAA bowls and BCS bowls, including the
BCS national championship game. This means that from September
through November, Division I-A schools reign supreme because of
NCAA regulations and in January they reign supreme under BCS
regulations. In short, the NCAA and BCS have market power because
each organization controls a "market for which there is no reasonable
substitute," 386 and each organization excludes I-AA schools from
competing in this market.
This all came to pass because, in 1976, approximately sixty
schools founded a football cartel known as the College Football
Association. 387 By 1978, this cartel had caused the NCAA to create a
new second tier of Division I football by forming something they called
Division I-AA.388

By

1982, the NCAA

had pushed ninety-three

schoolS389 into this second tier in the wake of costly and unnecessary
rules for membership in the first tier. 390 It is clear this second tier of
Division I football was not made to accommodate football fans (the
consumers). Rather, it was made to accommodate revenue sharing
among big-time football schools. And, in the process, the NCAA
eliminated Division I schools like Yale and Furman from top-tier
Division I competition even though they were fielding better football
teams than most schools the NCAA did not eliminate. 391 The year the
NCAA eliminated the Ivy League, Yale had a 9-1 record and was one
of the most powerful teams in the east. 3 9 2 The two years before the
NCAA demoted Furman; it went 9-1 and 8-3 respectively and had
higher Power Ratings than both LSU and Texas in 1980, and a higher
Power Rating than Auburn in both 1980 and 1981.393 Since 2005,
LSU, Texas, and Auburn have won three of the six national
championship games. 394
Where would Furman fit in now if the NCAA had not pushed it
into the second tier of Division I football? Before answering this
question, take into consideration the fact that Stanford University,

386.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 n.49 (1984).
387.
See NCAA Slices, supra note 77.
388.
Id.
389.
Division I-AA FeaturesNew Teams, supra note 84.
390.
See NCAA Slices, supra note 77.
391.
See infra text accompanying notes 392-93.
392.
See Pennington, supra note 89; Howell, supra note 97 (listing 1981 ratings).
393.
See Howell, supra note 97 (listing 1980 ratings); Howell, supra note 98 (listing 1981
ratings).
394.
Tim Hyland, College Football National Champions: The Complete List, ABOUT.COM,
http://collegefootball.about.com/od/nationalchampions/alchampions-list.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2011).
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with 6,900 undergraduate students,3 9 5 defeated Virginia Tech 40-12 in
the 2011 BCS Orange Bowl. 3 9 6 Also, take into consideration the fact
that Stanford ended the next (2011) season ranked fourth in the
nation, with an 11-1 record, earning it a match up with third ranked
Oklahoma State in the 2012 BCS Fiesta Bowl, 3 9 7 which Stanford lost
in a thrilling 41-38 overtime game.39 8 If given a chance, small schools
can play big-time football.
There was no rhyme or reason to the second tier created by the
big-time football schools. The new NCAA Division I-A schools cared
only about their bottom line, and the fewer schools in the first tier, the
In 1982, both the Southern
more money each would receive.
Conference and the Mid-American Conference were cut en masse from
the first tier of NCAA's Division I.399 But, somehow before the 1983
season began, the NCAA readmitted the Mid-American Conference. 400
This was great for the MAC, but for some reason, the Southern
Conference, which had higher Power Ratings than the MAC in both
1980 and 1981, was left behind.40 1 How can this injustice be
explained? Additionally, schools that the NCAA cut in the mass
conference purges had further reason to complain when the NCAA
allowed schools that did not meet its new I-A criteria to remain if they
happened to be in a conference that consisted of at least six football
teams, provided that half met I-A criteria. Which schools was the
NCAA trying to protect with this exception?
In the end, these cuts were revenue-sharing measures among
divined members of the NCAA's new I-A; they were not for the fans.
That is, the big-time football schools did not carve out two Division I
tiers because of the fans, but in spite of them. In the process, they
eliminated most underdogs and increased the cost of doing business.
Explaining why the BCS system is not fan friendly, Utah's President,
Michael Young, noted that it eliminated the underdog and, as he said,
"everyone loves the underdog."402

395.
Stanford Univ., Stanford Facts 2012, http://facts.stanford.edu/chron.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2012).
396.
See James Howell, Virginia Tech HistoricalScores, supra note 133.
Stanford Univ., Bowl Central, http://www.gostanford.com/bowlcentral (last visited
397.
Oct. 26. 2011).
Brian McIntyre, Fiesta Bowl, Stanford Vs Oklahoma State: Cowboys open Door for
398.
Share of National Title, SBNATION, Jan.3, 2012, http://www.sbnation.com/ncaa-football/2012/
1/3/2678873/oklahoma-state-vs-stanford-fiesta-bowl-2012-score-recap/in/2376692.
399.
NCAA Slices, supra note 77.
400.
O'Connor, supra note 76.
401.
See id.
402.
BCS Hearing, supra note 149, at 237 (testimony of Michael Young, President,
University of Utah).
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To make his point, he singled out George Mason University
from a I-AA conference, which, on its way to basketball's Final Four in
2006, knocked off defending champion North Carolina as well as
Michigan State and Connecticut, each of which had won the national
championship in one of the prior six years. 403 In this testimony,
President Young said that if today anyone
proposed a system for a new college sport in which 120 universities were to participate,
and suggested that nearly half of those institutions would be, for all practical purposes,
eliminated from the national championship even before their seasons begin, that
404
person's idea would be met with tremendous derision.

This suggestion, of course, has not only been made, it was
implemented when the NCAA created Division I-AA and forced
schools to leave their Division I status. 40 5 According to the Daily
Oklahoman, it was "one of the most divisive issues in the [NCAA's]
history. 406 This involuntary exclusion from a privileged group has
created a boycott that continues today.
At the end of the day, the NCAA precluded nearly half of the
football teams in Division I from competing in I-A's regular season and
for I-A's national championship before the season even started. 407 As
part of this purge, the NCAA eliminated schools that invented the
game even though they were still competitive. The NCAA made this
split and created I-AA for monetary reasons-not for procompetitive
reasons.
The fans love the underdog. Not only did the fans love it when
George Mason went to the NCAA Final Four in 2006, they also loved it
when I-AA Butler took Duke to the wire in the 2010 finals and when
Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) went to the Final Four in
2011.408 We know they loved watching the underdog because VCU's
trip to the Final Four in 2011 was front page news in the Washington
Post,409 and the television rating for the 2010 Duke-Butler final was
31 percent higher than the 2009 North Carolina-Michigan State
final.4 10 Moreover, the Duke-Butler game had the highest number of
viewers since the Arizona-Kentucky final in 1997.411 Speaking of TV
403.
See NCAA Tournament History, supra note 156.
404.
BCS Hearing, supra note 149, at 232 (testimony of Michael Young, President,
University of Utah).
405.
See O'Connor, supra note 76.
406.
NCAA Slices, supra note 77.
407.
See supra Part I.B.

408.

Infra text accompanying note 410.

409.
Liz Clarke, Butler Ends VCU's Cinderella Run in the Semifinals, WASH. POST, Apr.
3, 2011, at Dl.
410.
See Duke-Butler NCAA Final Generates Highest TV Rating Since 2005, supra note
162.
Id.
411.
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ratings for the "little guy," the 2010 Virginia Tech-Boise State football
ratings were the second highest of the year, including conference
championship games.4 12
Television ratings for the I-AA schools would be high, too, if the
NCAA allowed them to compete with the big-time players on the
football field. Even with the scholarship differential, Appalachian
State took on, and beat, fifth-ranked Michigan on the road in 2007.413
Likewise in 2010, I-AA James Madison topped Orange Bowl-bound
Virginia Tech on the road. 4 14
Today these games are an exception to the rule and,
concededly, no one wants to go watch lopsided football games. This,
however, will not happen if the NCAA removes the I-AA distinction.
It will not happen because I-AA schools will no longer be "second-class
citizens" 415 and will be able to recruit. It will not happen because
today there are more talented high school football players than in the
past and parity is inevitable. 416 And it will not happen because
schools will seek their own conference level just as they do in
basketball. What will happen is that Cinderella will get to go to the
ball when she rises above the pack.
And when Cinderella is at the ball, the games make national
news because everybody loves the underdog. Fans want to see all
Division I football schools compete during the regular season and in
the postseason, like they do in other sports, but unreasonable
restraints have prevented this from happening.
One unreasonable restraint is the requirement that I-A schools
have stadiums large enough to accommodate 15,000 fans and average
15,000 customers per home game once every two years. 417 Today, first
class I-A conferences, with their billions in television revenue, are
going to do well regardless of what happens to the schools the NCAA
If Harvard, with its twenty-six billion dollar
puts into I-AA.
endowment, 418 wishes to play before one-thousand fans, and is
financially capable of doing so, the market place should allow it. All
this restraint does is make it hard for many schools to qualify for I-A
status. For example, Villanova, which is a member of the I-A Big East
in all sports except its I-AA football program, has seriously considered
Jenkins, supra note 129.
412.
Long, supra note 169.
413.
Id.
414.
See Pennington, supra note 89.
415.
416.
See Long, supra note 169.
417.
See generally 2010-11 NCAA MANUAL, supranote 104, § 20.9.7.3.
Kathy Hopkins, 10 Private Universities With Largest FinancialEndowments, U.S.
418.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/
2011/06/28/10-universities-with-largest-financial-endowments.
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moving football to I-A as well. 4 1 9 However, Villanova has a problem
because its stadium only seats 12,500.420 This is the same Villanova
that was ranked thirtieth in the 2009 Sagarin strength of schedule of
rankings (ahead of e.g. Oklahoma State, Florida State, West Virginia,
UCLA, Michigan State, and Notre Dame). 421 Is it fair that a seating
capacity restraint is keeping Villanova from competing at the I-A
level? If Division I-A is looking for quality of competition, perhaps
they should eliminate the seating capacity restraint and replace it
with a strength of schedule restraint.
Seating capacity and
attendance restraints do not promote legitimate goals such as product
quality, safety standards, or consumer confidence; they are
unreasonable restraints. 422
The varsity sport requirement is also an unreasonable
restraint. A school may compete in NCAA Division I if it sponsors
fourteen varsity sports, unless it wishes to compete in I-A football, in
which case it must sponsor sixteen varsity sports. 423 This restraint
only drives up the cost of sponsoring two additional sports, a cost that
has nothing to do with football.
This does not promote a
procompetitive football purpose.
The overall spending on athletic scholarship requirements is
another unreasonable restraint. A school in I-A must come up with $4
million a year to spend on athletic scholarships while the NCAA only
requires I-AA schools to spend $1.2 million. 424 The restraint is
intended to keep schools on tight budgets out of I-A, and in the
process, it drives up the cost of doing business of those who choose to
get into I-A. This rule is not reasonably necessary to promote a
procompetitive football purpose.
Scholarship differentials in football also unreasonably restrain
competition. After the NCAA divided Division I into two tiers, the
first tier was given more football scholarships than the second tier. 4 2 5
Today the first tier is entitled to eighty-five scholarships and the
second tier is limited to sixty-three. 426 The disparity, of course, is an
attempt to lower the quality of I-AA football, which it does. In the
process, it also drives up the cost of I-A business and keeps smaller

419.
Kevin McGuire, Appalachian State with Fewer Hurdles to FBS than Villanova,
EXAMINER.COM,
(Aug. 23,
2011),
http://www.examiner.com/college-football-in-national
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420.
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See Sagarin, supra note 174.
See Pennington, supra note 89.
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Similar to the athletic
schools with tight budgets out of I-A.
scholarship requirement, this rule is an unreasonable restraint and is
not reasonably necessary to promote a procompetitive football
purpose. When it comes to football, it is unreasonable for the NCAA
to mandate that I-AA schools play with fewer scholarships than I-A
schools. If the competitive playing field is to be level, the NCAA
should entitle all Division I schools to offer the same number of
football scholarships just like they do in all other sports. Whether all
schools are able to fill their quota is another question. The quota,
however, should be a reasonable one and not one designed to limit
competition.
In setting a quota, the NCAA should keep in mind that NFL
teams have only forty-five players on their active roster and eight on
their inactive roster, 427 as compared to the average I-A team, which
has eighty-five scholarship players with thirty-two walk-ons. 428 One
example of football extravagance, says Andrew Zimbalist, a leading
expert in sports economics, 429 is the size of Division I-A football
teams. 430 In his opinion, "[slixty (or fewer players) would do fine." 4 31
This, he estimates, would save the average I-A college approximately
$1 million a year. 4 3 2
While the NCAA may argue to the contrary, it was clear to
outside observers at the time of the purge that the restraints were not
imposed for competitive purposes but, rather, it was about the money.
As outside observer, Bill Pennington of the New York Times said the
Ivy League was demoted to Division I-AA because of "a squabble over
John O'Connor of the Richmond Times
television revenue." 433
Dispatch said Division I football was split because "[b]ig-time football
schools were not satisfied with their share of television time and
financial remuneration." 434 Writers for the Encyclopedia Britannica
said that "[b]y the 1990s television revenues were going almost
entirely to the big football schools, and major conference
realignments . . . as a result of actions initiated by the CFA."4 35 In
other words, these restraints were not imposed for the welfare of the

427.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 132 at 41, 73.
428.
Id. at 83.
Id. at Biography. Mr. Zimbalist is the Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics at
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435.
Gridiron Football, supranote 43.
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fans; it was about the money and what the NCAA had to do in order to
hold its organization together. 436
What the NCAA and Division I-A schools did was not valid
under the Sherman Act. First, I-A schools did not join with the NCAA
to promote legitimate regular season goals such as product quality,
Instead they joined
safety standards, or consumer confidence.
together for the illegitimate purpose of eliminating almost half of the
Division I football schools from competing with the first-tier
conferences, which today have annual television contracts exceeding a
billion dollars, and to prevent these schools from competing in
postseason NCAA and BCS bowl games. They simply joined together
to exclude others from seeking fame and fortune, and they did so for
their own pecuniary benefit.
Secondly, the NCAA has not enacted rules of participation for
procompetitive purposes. Instead they have enacted rules without
legal justification to keep half of the NCAA's Division I schools from
competing at the highest level. As a result, these rules have stymied
If these
competition and increased the cost of doing business.
cost
of
doing
business
were
removed,
the
unreasonable restraints
would decrease for everyone and the meltdown of the struggling
second-class I-A schools would be less likely because their bottom line
would be better. Today you are not being asked to decide how the
football money should be divided, but rather you are being asked to
decide whether some Division I schools should be able to exclude other
Division I schools from competing on an equal basis.
The restraints imposed by the NCAA and the I-A conferences
and institutions do not stop when the regular season ends. In fact,
they increase. In the late 1990s, a cartel known as the BCS,
consisting of I-A schools, joined together to play in the four most
lucrative postseason bowl games and to create a first-tier Division I
national championship football game. 4 3 7
The BCS maintains it was formed in order to provide the
people with a national championship game they would not otherwise
have. 4 3 8 This would be a legitimate goal if the fans really wanted a
BCS postseason bowl system to determine the national champion, but
they do not. Eighty-five percent of the people in a 2007 Gallup poll
said they preferred to see the I-A national champion crowned through
a playoff,4 39 not a game put together by a BCS selection committee.
But even if the BCS and I-A schools got their act together and
436.
437.
438.
439.

See id.
See BCS MEDIA GUIDE 2010-11, supra note 111, at 47-51.
Id.
ZIMBALIST, supra note 132, at 181 n.3.
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produced a playoff system, the cartel would still be in violation of the
law because the event is only open to I-A schools. 4 4 0 Do you really
think this fair?
At the end of the 2009 football season, for example, the Sagarin
strength of schedule rankings placed I-AA Villanova, William & Mary,
Montana, and Richmond ahead of schools like Michigan, Arizona
State, Kansas State, and Maryland. 441 Yet the BCS had prohibited
these I-AA schools from competing for the national championship and
in their prestigious postseason Bowls from day one of that season. 442
There is no potential for a George Mason, Butler, or VCU-type story in
football. Does this favor competition? Not only have the fans suffered,
but the exiled I-AA schools have suffered too. These schools have lost
the exposure of competing for a first-tier national championship and
the resultant increase in quality applicants. They have also suffered
financially, as demonstrated by the $554 million the 120 I-A schools
took home from the BCS bowls between 2006 and 2009443 while the
120 I-AA schools were given approximately $7 million "to support the
overall health of college football." 4 4 4
It is evident that the NCAA designed these restraints to make
a certain class of schools second-class citizens, not to maintain the
competitive balance. These restraints were designed to, and did,
create a minor league-a league that was not permitted by the BCS to
compete for the major league championship. As a result of this minor
league status, I-AA schools have lost fan and recruit interest. But
most importantly, they lost television's interest. Football at the I-AA
level is on life support.
Five of the 120 I-AA football programs had a median net profit
of $378,000 in 2010445 as compared to sixty-nine of the 120 I-A
The
programs, which had a median net profit of $9,123,000.446
remaining 115 I-AA football programs had a median net loss of $1.6
million. 4 4 7 The I-AA athletic programs have gone from bad to worse.
No I-AA athletic program reported a net profit in 2010, and net losses

BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, supra note 109 at 8-9.
440.
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441.
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442.
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444.
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have gone from $5,900,000 in 2004 to $9,700,000 in 2010.448 I-AA's
overall net loss continued to rise in 2010, increasing by 6.3 percent, 4 4 9
while I-A schools stopped the bleeding when their overall net loss
decreased by 7.6 percent. 4 50
Almost thirty years ago, a judge concluded that the NCAA had
victimized large football schools and granted them relief under the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 451 But he warned that if a "power elite" later
emerged and abused its competitive edge through illegal means,
antitrust laws would provide relief.4 5 2 In so ruling, he said that "[i]f
today's victim . .. is tomorrow's [violator], the Sherman Act [could] be
employed against it.
Instead, yesterday's violators (the NCAA) joined with
yesterday's victims (I-A schools) and, along with the BCS, forged a
new power elite to become today's violators. The NCAA should not,
and cannot, use antitrust law to let these forces carve out a
competitive advantage and stymie smaller schools for financial
purposes. We are here today asking that all games played against
I-AA schools be treated as a game against a "deserving team." We are
here today asking for relief from this new power elite. We are here,
requesting a verdict for today's victims.
V. OTHER OPTIONS
As we have seen, there has been a call for the DOJ to bring an
antitrust suit against the BCS, and they have this request under
advisement. 454 Regardless of what the DOJ does on behalf of the
second-class I-A schools, there is no doubt someone should launch an
investigation, or file a lawsuit, on behalf of the I-AA schools. In
addition to the NCAA and the BCS, potential defendants could include
the NCAA conferences that make up Division I-A and the collective
I-A institutions.
But maybe there are other ways of addressing these
intercollegiate athletic problems. Perhaps, in lieu of a lawsuit, the
NCAA could amend its bylaws. The DOJ made it clear in its response
to Senator Hatch that it would prefer to resolve this problem using

448.
449.
450.
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other options, such as legislative action or amendments to the NCAA
bylaws. 455
A. Amend NCAA Bylaws
Most NCAA bylaws pass Sherman Act muster. In Board of
Regents, the Court said, "[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering
teams and therefore
competition among amateur athletic
in intercollegiate
public
interest
they
enhance
because
procompetitive
456 But, the Court rejected the television restrictions in that
athletics."
lawsuit because they did not fit into this protected mold.
To help fix today's problems, the NCAA could enact one bylaw
that eliminates the unreasonable restraints imposed on I-AA schools,
and one bylaw that sets reasonable limits on the amount a single
institution could spend on its football and basketball programs. It
could also enact a bylaw that requires a more equitable distribution of
football and basketball revenues among all institutions. These bylaws
would fit into Board of Regents's "protected mold." These bylaws
would fit into the protected mold because the Board of Regents
majority recognized that the need to maintain a competitive balance
among amateur athletic teams in the NCAA was legitimate and
important. 457 And, to this end, the Court agreed the NCAA needed to
issue rules that govern "the manner in which members of [their]
enterprise . . . share the responsibilities and the benefits of the total
venture."458
In explaining why the NCAA's television plan was an
unacceptable regulation, the Board of Regents Court said it, among
other things, did not
regulate the amount of money that any college may spend on its football program, nor
the way in which the colleges may use the revenues that are generated by their football
programs, whether derived from the sale of television rights, the sale of tickets, or the
459
sale of concessions or program advertising.

Expanding on this idea in his dissent, Justice Byron White 460 noted
that the majority had not held that the redistribution of football
revenue
455.
DOJ Mulls Antitrust Probe of College Football Championships, supra note 141.
456.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
457.
Id.
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Id. at 119.
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Football Hall of Fame. Joan Biskupic, Ex-Supreme Court Justice Byron White Dies, USA TODAY,
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alone would be sufficient to subject the television plan to condemnation under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Nor should it, for an agreement to share football revenues to a certain
extent is an essential aspect of maintaining some balance of strength among competing
colleges and of minimizing the tendency to professionalism in the dominant schools.
Sharing with the NCAA itself is also a price legitimately exacted in exchange for the
numerous benefits of membership in the NCAA, including its many-faceted efforts to
461
maintain a system of competitive, amateur athletics.

Justice White added that Board of Regents does not purport "to
hold that the NCAA may not (1) require its members who televise
their games to pool and share the compensation received among
themselves, with other schools, and with the NCAA; [or] (2) limit the
number of times any member may arrange to have its games shown on
television."462 In short, Board of Regents does not prohibit an
even-handed redistribution of football revenue, because the majority
recognized a need for the NCAA to maintain a competitive balance. 463
However, when money and intercollegiate athletics get mixed up,
there is a problem. This is because, as Peter Likins said when he was
the president of the University of Arizona, "we [presidents] do not play
well together when it comes to money." 4 64
Right now I-A college presidents are calling for reform in
athletics; I-AA presidents should be at the table too, and they should,
above all, be seeking to eliminate the I-AA football provision and its
accompanying restraints. If the disenchanted I-A schools allied with
the I-AA schools, there may then be enough votes for a restructured
NCAA.
However, if voluntary reforms do not seem possible,
Congressional interest might help convince college presidents that
voluntary change is everyone's best option. Congressional interest
already exists. In September 2011, when schools were changing
conferences en masse, a Congressman from an adversely affected
jurisdiction told the New York Times that these "issue[s] raised
concerns over taxes, antitrust law, and potentially Title IX."465 Brian
Frederick, the Executive Director of SportsFans.org, believes that the
NCAA is powerless, and says, "Congress can and must act before
realignment creates a situation so tenuous, the whole thing falls

years in the NFL before joining the Navy during World War II; after the war he decided to forgo
football and attend Yale law school. Id.
461.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 128 (White, J., dissenting).
462.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 117-20 (majority opinion).
463.
464.
Doug Lederman, A Better Look at Sports Budgets, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 23,
2006), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/06/23/ncaa.
465.
Pete
Thamel, Syracuse
and
Pittsburgh Switch
Conferences, Sowing
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/sports/ncaafootball/
congressional-scrutiny-of-conference-realignment-is-said-to-be-likely.html.
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apart."4 66 Congress, with little trouble, could provide a small fix by
amending the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which was enacted to
ensure relief for owners of NFL football teams.

B. PartiallyExempt the NCAA from Sherman Act
In the early 1950s, NFL owners agreed not to telecast outside
games into the home territories of other teams on days they were
playing at home. 467 The government thereafter filed a suit in the US
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, contending
that this, and other parts of the agreement, violated the Sherman
Act. 468
The court found for the government with regard to three parts
of the agreement but with regard to the agreement not to televise
outside games into the territories of teams playing at home, it found
for the owners. 469 The court said there was little doubt that the
challenged provision of the contract constituted a restraint of trade, 470
but concluded it was a reasonable restraint and therefore legal. 4 7 1 In
so finding the court noted:
The purposes of the Sherman Act certainly will not be served by prohibiting the
defendant clubs, particularly the weaker clubs, from protecting their home gate receipts
from the disastrous financial effects of invading telecasts of outside games. The member
clubs of the National Football League, like those of any professional athletic league, can
472
exist only as long as the league exists.

Thereafter, Congress codified this finding in the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961.473
What the Court in Board of Regents took from this legislation
was that when Congress was confronted with antitrust issues that
needed clarification, Congress thought it was its job to clarify them
and the Court thought it was significant that Congress had not acted
in the instant (Boardof Regents) matter.474
Since Congress had no trouble intervening in 1960 to help save
the "weaker clubs" in professional sports it certainly should not be
reluctant to intervene today to return "competitive equity" to college
466.
Frederick, supra note 192.
467.
United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
468.
Id.
469.
Id. at 330.
470.
Id. at 322.
471.
Id. at 326.
472.
Id.
473.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2006).
474.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106 n.28 (1984) ("[I]t
is not without significance that Congress felt the need to grant professional sports an exemption
from the antitrust laws for joint marketing of television rights.").
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athletics, especially because the necessary intervention would be
minimal.
In Board of Regents, the NCAA argued that the purpose of its
television plan was to promote athletically balanced competition. 475
The Court rejected this argument. 476 Thus, if Congress wants to help
create athletically balanced competition in college athletics it could
enact a legislative fix. One such fix would be to insert a new section
into the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which might look something
like this:
§

1295. The antitrust laws, as defined in section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended (38 Stat. 730) [15 U.S.C. 12], or in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended (38 Stat. 717) [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], shall not apply when the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the
rights of NCAA member institutions in the sponsored telecasting of athletic events
engaged in or conducted by its member institutions.

C. The Internal Revenue Code
Colleges and universities receive significant tax subsidies given
in the public interest. 477 But it is not in the public interest to have a
cartel of football schools in Division I excluding other Division I
schools from equal participation.
So, Congress could consider
attaching strings to big-time football school tax subsidies. 478
The federal government subsidizes both public and private
institutions in several different ways. For example, colleges are
subsidized through tax-free bonds 479 and through deductible
contributions they receive. 480 Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) permits a 100 percent deduction for contributions
to entities "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 48 1 In addition to

contributions for educational purposes, donors may also make
contributions for athletic purposes and in return receive favorable
treatment, such as preferred seating. These contributions are 80

475.
Id. at 97.
476.
Id. at 117.
477.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
478.
John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 109, 156.
479.

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., CBO PUB. NO. 3005, TAX PREFERENCES FOR

COLLEGIATE SPORTS 12 (May 2009) [hereinafter TAX PREFERENCES],
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10055/05-19-CollegiateSports.pdf.
480.
See Colombo, supra note 478, at 156.
481.
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2006).
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percent deductible. 482 Experts say that such contributions to public
institutions alone reduced tax revenue by approximately $100 million
from 2004 to 2005.483 An accounting professor at the University of
Texas applauds tax subsidies for colleges and does not want to see
them reduced. 48 4 Nevertheless, he said, "from an equity standpoint, it
isn't fair that wealthy people can treat their personal entertainment
expenses as a charitable donation." 485
In addition to these deductible contributions, the IRC exempts
income earned by colleges, the NCAA, and college conferences from
taxation under IRC section 501.486 Section 501(c)(3) exempts from
taxation "[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, 487 or to foster national or international amateur sports
But with today's tight budgets, many are
competition . . . ."488
questioning whether big-time football schools should be able to retain
a blanket tax exemption. At a minimum, people wonder whether
these entities should pay taxes on income earned by successful college
football and basketball programs.489
The IRS raised these same concerns in the 1940s when New
York University (NYU) owned Mueller Macaroni Company and moved
its profits to NYU's law school without either NYU or Mueller paying
taxes on that income. 490 Such concerns caused Congress to intervene
in 1950 and enact legislation that stopped schools, or any other
exempt organizations, from operating commercial activities on the
side while retaining the profits tax free. 49 1 This legislation is now set
forth in IRC sections 511-13, and requires exempt organizations to pay
482.
Colombo, supra note 478, at 149 n.73.
483.
Mark Alesia, Colleges Play, Public Pays, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, (Mar. 1, 2008, 9:09
PM), http://www.indystar.com/article/99999999/SPORTSO6/399990029/Colleges-play-public-pays.
484.
Id.
485.
Id. (quoting Michael Granof.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
486.
487.
Even though public colleges and institutions are already exempt from federal
taxation (by way of inter-governmental tax immunity and I.R.C. §§ 115), many seek recognition
under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) in order "to avoid confusion in the minds of potential donors and because
grants from private foundations are often limited to 'charitable' organizations exempt under
§ 501(c)(3)." Colombo, supra note 478, at 163 n.13.
488.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
See, e.g., Eric Dexheimer, Does Big-Time College Football Deserve its Big Tax
489.
Breaks?, STATESMAN.COM (Dec. 26, 2009, 7:47 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/texas/doesbig-time-college-football-deserve-its-big-149737.html (discussing whether colleges should be
allowed to maintain their nonprofit and tax-free status).
490.
C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951), superseded by statute,
I.R.C. §§ 511-13.
491.
Id. at 123 n.2.
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taxes on income earned by "any trade or business the conduct of which
is not substantially related . . . to the exercise or performance by such
organization of its [exempt purpose] under section 501."492 This is the
so-called "unrelated business income tax," and it applies to public, as
well as private, universities. 49 3
Since the government taxes NYU on the profits generated by
"Mueller's noodles and pasta," it would seem like the government
should also tax the sixty-nine I-A football schools that generated a
median net income of $9.1 million in 2010.494 But the government
does not tax them. The reason for this lies in the legislative history of
the "unrelated business income tax," which contemplated that a
university "would not be taxable on income derived from a basketball
tournament sponsored by it, even where the teams were composed of
students of other schools." 49 5 Further, "income of an educational
organization from charges for admissions to football games would not
be deemed to be income from an unrelated business, since its athletic
activities are substantially related to its educational program." 496
Following this lead, the IRS has since ruled on several
occasions that "college athletics are an 'integral part' of the
educational program of a university (and therefore 'substantially
related' to a university's educational program)"497 and tax exempt.
The mindset for blanket tax relief for intercollegiate athletics,
however, comes from earlier days when thinking was different. Back
in the day, the likes of the legendary Paul "Bear" Bryant at the
University of Alabama, who coached from 1958-82, kept his salary
$1.00 below the school president's because he "believed that it was
symbolically important for the university president to be paid more
than the head football coach." 498 But today Alabama's president, Dr.
Robert Witt, makes approximately $600,000 per year while the
football coach, Nick Saban, makes over $4 million per year. Other
schools are paying coaches more too. Fifty-six other coaches make $1
million or more per year, twenty-five make $2 million or more, nine

492.
I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006).
493.
See id. § 511(a)(2)(B); Colombo, supra note 478, at 134-35.
494.
See REVENUES & EXPENSES, supra note 19.
495.
H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 37, 109 (1950).
496.
S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 29, 107 (1950).
497.
Colombo, supra note 478, at 141 (citing Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul.
80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184).
498.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 132, at 39.
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make $3 million or more, two make $4 million or more, and the
average salary of a I-A coach is $1.3 million a year. 4 99
Not only are head coaches very well paid, but so are many
assistant coaches whose salaries now approach, or exceed, the
compensation of college presidents, and most exceed the compensation
of full-time professors.5 0 0 Indeed, in 2006, when coaches' salaries
began to escalate, former Congressman William M. Thomas, then
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, wrote to Myles
N. Brand, then President of the NCAA, and asked him to explain from
the federal taxpayer's point of view "why. . . the Federal government
[should] . . . subsidize the athletic activities of educational institutions

when that subsidy is being used to help pay for escalating coaches'
salaries."50 1 In response, Dr. Brand said "[t]he salaries are negotiated
at arm's length and are within the range of reasonable compensation
as defined for federal tax purposes." 502 Dr. Brand was, and is, right. 503
Therefore, as the law now stands, the taxpayer is left to subsidize the
multi-million dollar salaries received by college coaches.
Congress could, however, cap these salaries as a condition of
Even though Congressman
receiving favored tax treatment. 504
of the Senate Finance
member
ranking
Thomas retired in 2007,
Committee, Charles E. Grassley, continues to raise questions about
tax preferences going to colleges and universities.50 5 And to get
answers, he asked the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to compare
commercial income generated by the athletic departments with the
income generated by the rest of the schools' activities.5 06 In response,
the CBO said:

499.
Steve Wieberg et al., College Football Coaches See SalariesRise in Down Economy,
USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2009-11-09-coachessalary-analysisN.htm.
500.
Id.
Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm., U.S. Cong., to
501.
Myles Brand, President, NCAA (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/2006-10-05-congress-ncaa-tax-letter x.htm.
Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to William Thomas, Chairman, House
502.
Ways & Means Comm., U.S. Cong. 8 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://charitygovernance.blogs.
com/charity-governance/files/20061115_response tohousecommitteeonwaysandmeans.pdf.
503.
See Colombo, supra note 478, at 111 n.6, 140-53; cf. Letter from Myles Brand to
William Thomas, supra note 502, app. A at 4-9.
504.
Colombo, supra note 478, at 147, 155.
See generally Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, Grassley: CBO Study
505.
Raises Questions About Commercialization of Some College Athletic Programs (May 19, 2009),
at
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customeldataPagelD1 502=
available
20840.
506.
Letter from Chuck Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Cong.
Budget Office (Apr. 3, 2007), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?
customel-dataPagelD_1502=20840.
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Athletic departments in NCAA Division I schools derive a considerably larger share of
their revenue from commercial activities than do other parts of the universities....
Nonetheless, removing the major tax preferences currently available to university
athletic departments would be unlikely to significantly alter the nature of those
programs or garner much tax revenue even if the sports programs were classified, for
507
tax purposes, as engaging in unrelated commercial activity.

Explaining why tax revenue probably would not increase if Congress
tried to classify commercial income generated by the athletic
department as "unrelated business income," the report stated: "As
long as athletic departments remained a part of the larger nonprofit or
public university, schools would have considerable opportunity to shift
revenue, costs, or both between their taxed and untaxed sectors,
rendering efforts to tax that unrelated income largely ineffective."5 0 8
My response to Senator Grassley would have been different. If
schools do have "considerable opportunity to shift revenue, costs, or
both between their taxed and untaxed sectors,"50 9 the issuance of
appropriate IRS Treasury Regulations could remedy this situation.
Thereafter, the shifting of revenue or costs in order to understate
unrelated business income would subject those doing the shifting to
criminal prosecution, just like anyone else who shifts revenue or
expenses to understate income.5 10
Faced with the possibility of
prosecution, it is likely the responsible parties would make
appropriate accounting entries.
In addition to questioning whether athletic income should be
subject to the unrelated income tax, in June 2010 when the Big Ten
was considering expansion, Senators Grassley and Harkin sent a
letter to Big Ten Commissioner James E. Delaney asking him to
justify the Conference's tax-exempt status under IRC section
501(c)(3). 51 1 In particular, the letter noted that, according to the Big

507.
See TAX PREFERENCES, supra note 479, at vii-viii.
508.
Id. at viii.
509.
Id.
510.
See, e.g., United States v. Pomponio, 563 F.2d 659, 662-65 (4th Cir. 1977). In
Pomponio, the defendants were charged with filing individual income tax returns the
government contended were false because they failed to report income that had been carried as
"loans" to defendants on books of closely held corporations and because they deducted a
"partnership loss" that the government contended had been shifted from corporate books to
partnership books. Id. at 661-62. Defendants' claimed they intended to repay these "loans" and
that the loss had been incurred by the partnership. Id. at 662. Where income and losses belonged
was question of fact for the jury and the jury, in convicting, followed substance rather than form.
Id. at 662-65.
511.
See Letter from Charles E. Grassley & Tom Harkin, U.S. Senators, to James E.
Delaney, Comm'r, Big Ten Conference (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.
desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdflD2160017624.pdf.

2012]

ANTITRUST AND NCAA FOOTBALL

339

Ten's Form 990,512 the Conference's primary exempt purpose was "to
regulate intercollegiate athletics as institutional activities, to
encourage sound academic practices for student athletics, and to
establish harmonious relationships among member institutions."5 13
However, the senators said it appeared that the Big Ten was instead
focusing on, "NCAA athletics and the marketing, promotion, and
athletic
those
with
affiliated
activities
revenue-generating
Accordingly, the senators directed Commissioner
activities." 514
Delaney to justify the Big Ten's tax-exempt status by answering a
series of questions and by furnishing specified documents.5 15
The letter to Commissioner Delaney did not stop Nebraska
from joining the Big Ten, but it may have stopped further expansion
as well as the implosion of the Big Twelve. 5 16 Perhaps it is now time
for Congress to examine the tax-exempt status of these first-tier
conferences that will receive more than $13 billion in TV revenue in
the coming years.5 1 7
The situation might be different today had the NCAA and the
"band of CFA brothers" received a Grassley/Harkin-type letter when
they were downsizing Division I football in 1978 and 1981. Such a
letter, advising them that the tax-exempt status of their conferences
was in jeopardy because the downsizing "[s]eem[ed] to be [taking
place] for the sole purpose of enhancing the financial bottom line,"
might well have given them pause for thought.5 18 Likewise, if the I-A
conferences of today are abusing competition through illegal means by
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, it can be said that they are
hindering, rather than fostering, amateur sports competition and
thereby jeopardizing their IRC section 501(c)(3) tax status.
The IRS, the DOJ, and Congress seem to have strong
arguments for dramatic changes to the NCAA's current arrangements.

512.

For a blank Form 990, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FORM
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go.com/ncaalnews/story?id=5276551.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The best course of action would be for I-AA presidents to work
within the NCAA to obtain a merger of I-A and I-AA into one
division, like it was before 1978. Eliminating the bylaw creating the
distinction between I-A and I-AAs 19 would achieve this goal. In
attempting to remove this bylaw, the I-AA presidents should point out
that it is inconsistent with the NCAA's constitutional "[p]rinciple of
competitive equity," 520 which provides that:
The structure and programs of the Association and the activities of its members shall
promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual student-athletes
and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent in
52 1
participation in intercollegiate athletics.

The I-AA presidents should also point out that equitable reform
is in the air. This reform is coming from no less than Chuck Neinas,
interim commissioner of the Big Twelve, 522 and formerly the executive
director of the CFA,523 who is calling for a movement to eliminate the
automatic qualification statuS 5 2 4 (the provision creating the haves and
have-nots) within the BCS.
Instead of having privileged and
unprivileged teams, he prefers that all I-A schools should compete in
the BCS National Championship based on their own merit. 525
Reform should not stop with the BCS-now is the time for the
NCAA to initiate its own movement toward competitive equity.
Dennis Dodd, senior college football columnist for CBSSports.com,
believes the excess in I-A college football needs to go immediately. He
says:
Let's hope this is the moment [2011] when . . . a movement to take back college athletics
from the current stakeholders [begins]. . . . This has to be the point when universities
quit bowing down to King Football, quit drooling over the prospect of colorful uniforms,
stop being beholden to ratings.
Yeah, I know. That situation exists. It's called the Ivy League. Maybe I'm too
idealistic, but we're witnessing the alternative. There currently is no middle ground. If
you want to play in Division I-AA, that's up to you. If you want to step up, you gotta
play hard and pay hard....
Let's downsize. Now. Let's cut scholarships. Let's limit the number of coaches. Let's
limit their pay. . . . If everybody is playing by the same rules, it doesn't matter....

519.
See 2010-11 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 75, § 20.01.2.
520.
Id. § 2.10.
521.
Id.
522.
Dennis Dodd, B12 Commish Senses Big Change in BCS, CBSSPORTS.COM (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.cbssports.com/mcclblogs/entry/6270202/33203093.
523.
See Siegfried & Burba, supra note 181.
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Id.
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Football can't ever be this big again.... I've said for years FBS [I-A] football can exist
5 26
on 63 scholarships. Hell, Division I-AA does!

Dodd, in essence, says it is time to put "King Football" in its place and
seek a middle ground. He is right.
Eighty percent of the Division I-A presidents polled by the
Knight Commission believe "sweeping reform" of intercollegiate
athletics is necessary. 527 Division I-AA presidents were not polled,
and the time for polling has passed. The I-AA presidents need to
initiate reform-now. In addition to merging the two subdivisions, the
NCAA needs to reduce the number of football scholarships allowed per
school. Andrew Zimbalist has suggested sixty, a number he believes
would save I-A schools about a million dollars a year. 528 Dodd
suggests sixty-three. Regardless of the number, in the interest of
competitive equity, it should be the same for all Division I schools.
Such a reduction might not be out of the question. The NCAA
did not put a ceiling on football scholarships until 1973, when it voted
to limit the number to 105.529 In a later study, it was discovered that
the strongest schools were "more likely to have voted for this rule." 53 0
Since the stronger schools would have been the least likely to promote
parity, the surmised cost was the motivating factor for this surprising
vote. 531 In 1992, the NCAA again reduced the I-A scholarship ceiling,
this time to the present limit of eighty-five. 532 Consequently, a further
drop of scholarships to the realistic number of sixty-three is indeed a
possibility.
The NCAA should also give all Division I schools an
opportunity 533 to compete for the same football championship and the
same elite bowls throughout the year. This would create competitive
equity and spark fan (and television) interest among all Division I
schools, and not just among certain select schools. Whether such
change could actually take place remains to be seen because of the
way Division I is governed. In a nutshell, NCAA Division I is overseen
by a Board of Directors 534 which consists of eighteen presidents or
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Dennis Dodd, Now is the Time: Schools Must Take Back their Athletic Programs,
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See 2010-11 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 75, § 4.5.2(g).
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chancellors.5 35 Eleven of these presidents come from the eleven I-A
conferences, and seven come from the other 20 Division I
conferences. 536 A forty-nine member Management Council, consisting
of athletic directors and faculty, is under the Board of Directors. The
majority of these members come from I-A conferences. 537
When it comes to legislation, Divisions II and III have a one
member, one vote policy.5 38 But, in Division I the Management
Council acts "much like an elected legislature, such as the US House
of Representatives" 5 3 9 and either forwards or does not forward
proposed legislation to the Board of Directors for action. 540
In view of Division I's composition and form of governance, it
would appear at first blush that change from within is unlikely, but
this may not be the case. With all the conference realignments
presently taking place, enough nervous I-A schools might be
interested in change themselves. Today, I-A schools and conferences
might be willing to take meaningful steps toward competitive equity
rather than risk receiving a Grassley/Harkin-type letter inquiring into
their tax-exempt status. Division I-A schools might also be willing to
work toward competitive equity rather than risk Congress returning
TV contracting rights to the NCAA through an amendment of the
Sports Broadcasting Act.
If all else fails, I-AA presidents should not hesitate to seek
antitrust relief in court. The red warnings are flashing faster and
faster!
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